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Abstract 
Over the last few years the production process in the offshore Oil & Gas (O&G) industry has 
concentrated on innovative subsea solutions. This development has increased the need for 
advanced multi-purpose Offshore Support Vessels (OSV). Their role in oil field development has 
widened the intersection between the traditional petroleum and maritime sector, leaving the 
borderline between them somewhat diffused. This has increased the need for interfacing the two 
business sectors. As a response to the demand of innovative and efficient solutions, the O&G 
industry has implemented its novel operation scenario solution, termed Integrated Operations 
(IO). However, this study shows that the maritime sector is still oblivious to IO and its proven 
effect in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCF). The remarkable difference in the operational 
approach between the two sectors is a challenging situation as there is a need for a seamless 
interface between the two operational environments. 
This study describes the opportunities and limitations of adapting the IO approach into Maritime 
Asset Management (MAM) and specifically in the OSV management companies. The study has a 
practical approach to actual maritime operations, using specific problems encountered during 
normal operations, critical maintenance operations and an environmental initiative project. By the 
use of three industrial case studies, supported by interviews, the frictional elements in the 
operational interface of the two sectors have been identified. This has enabled the outlining of a 
new organizational approach to MAM. However, in order to utilize the full potential of IO 
several identified obstacles needs to be acknowledged by the maritime industry and mitigated 
through a joint effort and an open and including process. The study outlines 13 recommended 
actions specified to the authority, the oil field operator and the OSV companies for facilitating 
full implementation of IO into the maritime sector.  
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
1.1.1 Background 
At the end of the 1990s the Norwegian petroleum industry acknowledged the challenges 
they were facing. The increasing operational costs, declining rate of production due to 
field maturity and the safety focus required a re-engineering of the whole industry (OLF, 
2003). There was a need for better coordination and closer cooperation between the 
different stakeholders in order to obtain the desired level of safety and efficiency. The 
effort resulted in an implementation of new technology, work processes and 
organizational structures, which later became known as Integrated Operations (IO). 
Almost twenty years later the principals have been widely implemented and several IO 
centers have been developed across Norway. However, despite of the development within 
the petroleum industry, it seems like the same challenges are unattended in the maritime 
industry. Initial research in preparing this master’s thesis indicates that the OSV 
management companies are operating based on traditions rather than actual needs, and 
has not been a part of the IO development in the NCS. There is a need to research if this 
really is the situation and if adopting the IO approach could mitigate the problems they 
now are facing. 
 
According to Liyanage (2008) the large scale re-engineering started in 2005 with an 
increased momentum towards 2010. He also describes how the learning process and 
knowledge development can be valuable for other industries. If this is the case, there 
might be an opportunity of a significant value creation by implementing IO into maritime 
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asset management. The IO consultant, who was interviewed in this study, describes how 
the major oil field operators on the NCS require their suppliers to be IO compatible and 
hence force their partners to re-engineer as well. This requirement does still not apply for 
the maritime industry, but the operators are now indicating that this is a natural future 
step. According to Bai & Liyanage (2008) the current developments in industrial asset 
management is focusing towards the smart integration of complex operations, and 
particularly towards high risk and capital intensive assets. The theories within IO are also 
normally concerned with assets such as offshore production and drilling installations, but 
as this study will show it surely also apply for Offshore Support Vessels (OSV). 
1.1.2 Motivation 
If oil were blood, then production platforms would be the heart that pumps the blood 
through its veins (Liyanage, 2008). Following this analogy one can argue that the OSV 
are the muscles in the arms and legs. Lifting, dragging and moving equipment around, 
they have become an important part of the petroleum industry. At the very beginning of 
offshore production the best fit vessels were Norwegian fishing boats, developed through 
hundreds of years of experience with the harsh conditions in the North Sea. Lately they 
have become bigger and better, but also more complex. For a long time conventional 
Platform Supply Vessels (PSV) and Anchor Handling and Tug Support (AHTS) vessels 
were the only contribution by the maritime industry. However, as the demand for 
innovative solutions rose, the production process focused towards subsea installations. 
This has increased the need for versatile and advanced OSV in oil field developments and 
operations. This Multi-Purpose Vessel (MPV) has become an important tool in the 
advanced subsea operation environment. 
 
Recent years these vessels have developed even further and have taken on more tasks, 
e.g. stimulation and well control. The concept has proven cost effective due to their 
mobility and efficient hull. The development has widened the intersection of maritime 
and petroleum activities and has left the border line between them diffuse. There really 
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are no borders anymore, something which pose several challenges with respect to the 
operational development. As maritime asset management might be lagging with regards 
to novel operational scenarios, the situation seems to lead towards segregation, 
protectiveness of own operations and a disintegrated operational environment. This study 
addresses the issues of organizational effectiveness within a highly complex environment 
with tight couplings (Perrow, 1984). There seems to be a need for integrating the 
maritime management, their OSV and the oil field operators. 
 
1.1.3 Integrated Operations – Introducing the term 
During the last 10-15 years a significant amount of research and development has been 
undertaken to explore IO in different directions. Not all of them under the specific term 
IO. You might encounter descriptions such as eFields, Smart fields, e operations etc. 
Even if there are local differences they are all related movements towards smarter and 
more efficiently coordinated and controlled operations. OLF (2006) have concluded with 
the term Integrated Operations to describe the new collaboration, decision engineered and 
IT supported revolution in the NCS. The actual definition and meaning of the term has 
varied since the beginning of the 2000s. According to Statoil (2013) it can be understood 
as “employing real time data and new technology to remove barriers between disciplines, 
expert groups, and the company”. OLF (2006) defines the term to be “use of information 
technology to change work processes to achieve better decisions, remote control 
equipment and processes, and to move function and personnel onshore”. A common 
denominator in these two definitions and several others discovered through data 
acquisition in the subject seems to point towards new work processes, better decisions 
and a more efficient use of the organization by modern technology. This leaves room for 
many theoretical approaches to IO depending on the objective and the perspective to be 
studied. 
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Figure 1: The IO loop (IO research center NTNU, 2013) 
As figure 1 indicates there are many aspects to the IO loop and not all of them are 
expected to be relevant for the maritime industry at this stage. Even if the complexity 
might be comparable in some business areas, others might not be relevant. E.g. the 
visualization of the oil reservoir or precision drilling is hardly transferable to the 
maritime industry at the moment. However, there might be a need for the same 
technology or approach at a later stage. There are basically two approaches for this study, 
which not necessarily oppose each other. The first one being the implementation of the 
IO loop into maritime asset management as a self-sustaining operational philosophy. The 
second approach is obtaining a level of compatibility to other company’s functioning IO 
loop. The latter might be the easiest and most realistic approach for the maritime industry 
in the short term perspective. However, in this study the self-sustaining approach will be 
chosen as this might give the highest value for the effort. It will probably also fulfill the 
compatibility requirements.  
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As the principles of IO are based on major theoretical subjects e.g. organizational theory, 
change management, logistics, maintenance and operation management, industrial 
services, decision engineering etc., it is more relevant to describe the theoretical 
framework in that context. I.e. it is not effective to elaborate on a specific IO theory of a 
business area, not easily comparable to maritime assets. However, if there is a need for an 
extensive description of the implementation status of IO in the petroleum sector in NCS, 
it is recommended seeing Hauge (2011). 
1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SUB-OBJECTIVES 
The main objective for this study is to describe the potential effects of implementing the 
Integrated Operations approach in the maritime industry, and in particular to the OSV 
industry. In order to accomplish this objective three sub-objectives have been identified. 
These are: 
 
- Describe to what extent Integrated Operations is currently a part of the maritime 
operational management environment. 
- Analyze the opportunities and limitations of implementing Integrated Operations 
to the OSV industry. 
- Identify if there is a need for further study and research into the maritime 
perspective of Integrated Operations. 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.3.1 Specific issues and problems 
Based on the initial research in preparing the master’s thesis and the description in the 
previous chapters, the specific problems can be summarized as: 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
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- Despite of the focus on developing and implementing IO in the NCS, the 
maritime industry seems unfamiliar with the approach and its proven effect. This 
may lead to inefficient and unsafe operations particularly in the intersection of the 
petroleum and maritime industry. 
- The largest oil companies are requiring their offshore suppliers to be IO 
compatible. However, they have not applied this requirement to their OSV and the 
maritime management companies. When this step will be taken, the OSV 
companies will face significant challenges. The ones best prepared may increase 
their attractiveness and competitiveness. 
- It seems like the shipping companies function more as an appendix to the 
operations, and not fully integrated or conscious on their responsibility according 
to maritime law. This situation could explain the friction in maritime operational 
planning, recent accidents and the high level of maritime operational costs. There 
is a need to analyze the frictional elements of maritime operations in an 
organizational perspective. 
Management of OSV under normal conditions and routine operations may not necessarily 
give the perception of needs to monitor, communicate and co-operate closer, but often the 
smallest change can generate major problems at high costs. Whether it is a break-down of 
a critical component, an unexpected lack of qualified personnel or a change to the 
operational environment, challenges can grow into costly obstacles. This will particularly 
be the case without the proper planning, communication and common understanding of 
the situation.  
During the preparation of this study, several of these issues had already been identified. 
The most apparent observation was the seemingly normality of ad hoc task forcing. It 
seemed like the chaotic and critical work tasks attracted a certain kind of managers. The 
difficult and pressing emergencies required clear and firm actions, a problem solving 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
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attitude and ingenuity. The following statement was given in the first meeting with the 
vessel management team: “Every day is different, you never know what to expect, but it 
is interesting and challenging work”. The purpose of this study is not to make the work 
day more boring for the vessel managers, but maybe the study can show that reducing the 
level of unexpected and sudden work orders might actually benefit them. The hypothesis 
is actually that an integrated operational approach could benefit all stakeholders an 
increase value across the business areas. 
1.3.2 Research questions 
There is a need to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. To what extent is IO a part of the OSV maritime operational and managerial 
environment? 
2. What are the opportunities and limitations of implementing the IO approach in 
the maritime asset management? 
1.4 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS 
1.4.1 Scope and structure 
The study will begin by briefly describing the need for and the general understanding of 
IO in the petroleum industry. Thereafter follows a clarification of the perspective and 
focus of IO under this study. In order to place IO and the thesis into a theoretical 
framework, a literature review will be focused towards the areas relevant for developing 
the answers. This will include scientific works in Integrated Planning, Industrial services, 
decision engineering and performance management and military theory. 
The field work consists of analyzing three industrial cases, supported by interviews of 
involved personnel. The first case is an extensive planned maintenance and modification 
project of a well stimulation vessel. Case 2 will look at a company’s environmental 
initiative and identify any organizational difficulties in the process, and case 3 consists of 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
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an unscheduled critical maintenance task leading to millions in losses. Through these 
cases and the interviews the aim is to describe and exemplify the need for IO in the 
maritime industry and what opportunities and limiting realities exist. Learning from the 
problems identified in the case studies a novel operational scenario of maritime asset 
management will be developed. At the very end follows a short description of the 
necessary further research and recommended actions to the authority, maritime and 
petroleum industry. 
1.4.2 Delimitations 
A fundamental part of IO is the integration of all activities and resources in order to 
extract the synergetic effects. It is therefore a challenge to limit the study as everything is 
connected to everything. However, in this study IO will be reviewed in the frame of 
maritime operations, decision engineering and organizational effectiveness. The study is 
expected to be relevant for the maritime and the petroleum industry as a whole. However, 
the assets to be analyzed will be limited to advanced offshore support vessels. The 
operational perspective will be limited to the three cases. The study will not focus 
towards information technology, sensor-to-decision theory, but rather on work processes, 
organizational efficiency, collaboration and communication across disciplines. The 
results will not be quantifiable in the monetary sense. It has been necessary to limit the 
analysis to the qualitative description of removing the identified frictional elements. The 
study only follows one specific OSV company, something which might raise the level of 
uncertainty in the results. However, the uncertainty is mitigated through a verification 
process further described in part three; the results and analyses.  
 
1.4.3 The significance of the research 
The study will describe an area of IO theory, where little or no scientific work has 
previously been undertaken. The study might serve as a step stone towards further 
research into the field of advanced maritime operations. Through the activities and final 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
In the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 9 
report the study might help to close the gap between operational collaboration and set the 
issue on the shipping company’s agenda. The study hopes to highlight the significance of 
incorporating the OSV managers in IO and at the same time indicate the obstacles that 
have to be overcome on the way. One could expect the recommended actions to reduce 
costs, increase safety and obtain the same benefits as seen in the petroleum industry.  
 
PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SCIENTIFIC 
APPROACH 
In this section relevant theory for the study is presented. Delimitations have been made 
according to the previous stated perspective and focus areas. Even though some of the 
theoretical works presented in this chapter are not traditionally combined in IO, it is 
expected to help form the future operating solutions for the maritime industry. In chapter 
2 some of the theoretical constellations are extracted and based on the undersigned’s 
previous submitted materials in the class of Industrial Services and in the class of 
Decision Engineering and Performance Management (DE&PM) at the University of 
Stavanger (UIS). The prior work is highly relevant with regards to implementing the IO 
approach to the maritime industry and is therefore adapted to describe parts of the 
theoretical framework of this study. The scientific methods for obtaining the necessary 
knowledge are described in the latter part of this section. 
2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 INTEGRATED WORK PROCESSES AND PLANNING 
2.1.1 Integrated work processes 
According to Bai & Liyanage (2007) Integrated Work Processes (IWP) “involves a series 
of technical and managerial measures for integration and streamlining of decision loops 
and activity flow across disciplines”. They also highlight that information has to be 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
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available to all decision stakeholders near real time. This creates a need for establishing 
new teams and organizational structures. The new teams should have decision making 
authorities, access to real time filtered information and tools for live collaboration 
between vendors, operators and management. It is important to highlight that new 
technology and smart tools will not alone facilitate the leap towards IO in the NCS, there 
is also a need for novel work processes and organizational optimization (Bai & Liyanage, 
2007). One of several identified concerns of non-integrated planning and work 
management tools are conflicts, misunderstandings and unnecessary use of time and 
resources (Bai & Liyanage, 2007). According to OLF (2005) the streamlining and 
integration of work processes across different disciplines are vital for the IO success. 
  
Traditionally the monitoring and decision making has been done offshore. The operators 
on board were cut off from the experts on shore and their line management. If there were 
any advice or communications in the decision making process, it was made by phone, 
mail or similar single line dialogue. This often resulted in a different understanding of the 
reality, as different information was given to the involved personnel. Planning and 
execution were not very flexible or adaptable. The following paragraph was developed 
and submitted by the undersigned during the spring of 2012, in the subject of DE&PM at 
the UIS. It became the start of the idea of developing the IO approach for maritime asset 
management. 
 
Frankel (2008) describe how the new role of technology in decision making enables new 
work processes and a more efficient working environment. Due to the increased 
availability of live data one can alter directions, adapt to the situation both on shore and 
off shore. Hence, time is reduced between decision steps in the organization. He also 
describes the need for abandoning the traditional rituals of regular meetings at defined 
times with a fixed agenda. These rituals are ineffective as new communication forms are 
available. The internet and information exchange capacity has changed how we interact 
with each other. Mail, chat rooms, video streaming and satellite phones have facilitated 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
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new ways of communicating and working together. The technology is making room for 
new work processes and more effective ways of how an organization can function. 
According to OLF (2005) a vital requirement in this setting is sharing of the information. 
 
Bai & Liyanage (2007) describes that traditionally in the O&G industry, information was 
kept close and within the respective disciplines and the functions in the organization. The 
focus was on their local process and segregated planning of the same identical operations. 
There was limited interaction across disciplines and the experts and workers were only 
familiar with their own specific role. According to Bai & Liyanage (2008) there is a need 
to install an effective planning process, rearranging all activities within or between 
disciplines in order to fully realize IWP. These are issues on the agenda of the petroleum 
industry, but as the preliminary studies for this thesis indicates, the maritime industry are 
oblivious to this knowledge, including the petroleum operators’ initiatives in mitigating 
the traditional challenges. 
2.1.2 Integrated planning 
Integrated Planning (IP) is about coordinating, scheduling and executing the work tasks 
more efficiently (Bai & Liyanage, 2008). One should strive to extract a synergetic effect 
by sharing plans, reduce duplication of work and reduce last minute changes due to 
misunderstandings and poor communication. According to Payne (2008) IP enables the 
alignment of key elements in the planning processes in order to provide a common 
understanding across work plans. The common understanding and overview is an 
important feature that will be further described in the context of modern military theory 
in the following chapter.  
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Bai & Liyanage (2008) have identified three operational requirements of IP. These are: 
• Planning the future work with horizontal periodic plans with constraints factors. 
• Creating commitment to reaching work process milestones and template for 
continuous integrity in planning. 
• Enhancing the IT environment to better suit the users. 
According to Bai & Liyanage (2008) IP involves a short, medium and long term 
perspective in planning and the constraints can be identified using these perspectives. The 
short term plan typically includes the operational details and is made on a weekly basis. 
The plan requires measureable objectives in order to ensure business success. Medium 
term plans looks a bit further and contain information of the future work tasks in relation 
to obtaining production continuity. The plans could typically be on a monthly basis. 
Multi-discipline work teams can help identify and reduce conflicts and constraints that 
are limiting the production capacity. The long term plan reflects the company’s strategy 
and includes constraints such as costs, time and risk on a yearly basis (Bai & Liyanage, 
2008). 
 
Due to different constraints IP is implemented to a varied degree in the O&G business 
environment. Bai & Liyanage (2008) has classified the degree of IP into four levels, 
whereas level 1 is limited and level 4 is high. 
- Level 1: At the first level the different disciplines plan their activities for 
themselves and come up with a list of work. Through a multi-discipline work 
shop the different disciplines agree upon a priority list, taking different constraints 
under consideration.  
- Level 2: The different disciplines enter their data into an independent database. 
An integrated planning process has been implemented to prioritize the work 
according to the short, medium and long term objectives and according to a 
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standard input list of criteria. The other important part of level 2 is the key 
performance indicators (KPIs) in order to evaluate the planning process. 
- Level 3: The major part of stepping into this level is the integration of planning to 
Onshore Centers (OC). By the use of high quality communication technology 
multi-disciplines can connect to evaluate real time feedback. 
- Level 4: Focus to improve and expand the cooperation between external vendors 
and partners. 
The levels described above will be used to assess to what extent the traditional maritime 
operations within the offshore segment have implemented IP and IO. 
2.1.3 Systems engineering and overview 
This chapter is based on a previous submitted constellation of theories by the 
undersigned, in the subject of DE&PM at UIS during the spring of 2012. The description 
is important in understanding the larger picture of the needs in a new maritime asset 
management system. When viewing the organization as a system one obtains a richer 
picture (Jackson, 2000). The different subsystem’s interactions and interrelations are 
revealed and can be evaluated against the organizational goal and objectives. If the 
perspective is too limited and narrow one risk measuring and managing the wrong things 
(Frankel, 2008). Parnell et al. (2011) describe systems thinking as looking into a more 
complex world were single changes effects other parts of the system. A holistic approach 
is needed to uncover hidden critical changes and non-conformities. Frankel (2008) 
describe the need of an effective decision-based management as a result of the rapid 
changes and development within technology and market requirements. He also describes 
the need to integrate the structure of an organization with the available information. This 
has become even more relevant in recent years and seems to increase exponentially. 
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The meaning of overview should be interpreted as a “detailed understanding of decisions 
that would allow an organization to perform effectively and efficiently (Liyanage 2012). 
Frankel (2008) states that in order for decisions to be efficient and effective they need to 
be taken at the appropriate level in the organization at the right time. One needs to enable 
near real time flow of operational information, filter and amplify it for tactical and 
strategic use (Frankel, 2008). Operational, tactical and strategic decisions presented by 
Frankel (2008) and their impact on business over a short, medium or long term are an 
important part of the role of obtaining an “overview”. Having the proper overview 
enables that correct and sufficient information is presented to the right decision maker 
and that they are taken in accordance with the stated goals. In order to achieve this, the 
impact and interdependence of each decision has to be analyzed with respect to the 
complete risk involved (Frankel, 2008). In order to remove barriers of optimal decisions 
and information flow one need to integrate the information, organizational structural 
systems and the operational partnership. 
2.1.4 Value creation and knowledge as an asset 
Within the field of industrial services there are relevant information, that should be 
utilized when describing and implementing IO in the maritime industry. Between an 
operator and a service provider, e.g. an OSV company, you have many of the elements of 
the traditional seller-customer relationship. In the class of Industrial Services at UIS, 
during the autumn of 2011, the undersigned submitted a perspective of value creation that 
is further developed in the context of IO. The customers all want value creations, and if 
you want to become competitive you should focus towards how your customers can 
create values (Grønroos, 2000). In order to truly understand the common goal one needs 
to accept that knowledge has become an important asset and a commodity. According to 
Windrum and Tomlinson (1999) Knowledge Intensive Services (KIS) is an external 
businesses’ primary source of knowledge information and form key inputs in their 
performance processes. In their paper they state that knowledge has overtaken the 
material inputs as the key source of value creation. Strambach (1997) argue that the 
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products of KIS are” Specialized experts knowledge, research and development ability, 
and problem-solving know-how”. He also describes the effects of this knowledge to be 
early recognition of problems and a more rapid adjustment to current economic and 
structural change. Understanding and acknowledging these statements could help the 
different stakeholders in maritime operations to open up their information channels and 
share experience and challenges early enough to minimize friction and ineffective 
operations. There seems to be a need for the traditional maritime industry to adapt the 
novel approach in the theory of industrial services. Combining integrated work process 
and planning with industrial service and the process of benchmarking one might be able 
to open up enough for integrating the operations as well. 
2.2 BENCHMARKING 
During the course of this study it became apparent that mitigating the challenges and 
obstacles of IO may be related to the theory of benchmarking. This will be further 
elaborated when analyzing the results from the field studies. However, there is a need to 
describe the concept and some critical challenges of benchmarking. The following text is 
based on a previous submitted report in DE&PM at UIS during the spring of 2012. 
Benchmarking has been widely implemented by both small and larger businesses, but the 
definition and understanding of the term is varying (Kyrö, 2003). According to 
Christopher and Thor (1993), benchmarking is the process of comparing a company’s 
practices and techniques to other companies in order to improve their performance. It 
could also be seen as an approach for stating the company’s operating and productivity 
goals. Benchmarking is a process with several important steps. They involve the 
collection of data, analysis and comparison, goal setting and implementation of action 
plans and monitoring of progression (Liyanage, 2012). Five critical challenges in 
connection with the benchmarking process have been developed and all of these are 
likely obstacles to be faced during the implementation process of IO. They are: 
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Collaboration between competitors: How do you get competitors to exchange information 
of the sensitive areas where they may have supreme performance? The answer lies in 
acknowledging the nature of benchmarking, that you are never the best in all business 
areas. If you give in some parts you will gain in others. This is the concept that raises the 
overall quality of your business and the performance of an entire industry as a whole. 
 
Management involvement: According to St. Clair (1993) there is a challenge of obtaining 
management involvement. The necessary time and resources are often traded off to other 
more short-term actions and it can be difficult to keep up the momentum in order to 
implement the necessary changes. 
 
Obtaining accurate information: St. Clair (1993) also describes the challenge of obtaining 
correct, relevant and enough information in order to compare businesses and companies. 
The performance data varies as the companies are different in how and what they are 
recording and storing. Difficulties in comparing the valuable data could then occur. If the 
different companies commit to a high quality standard of the information, it could reduce 
this challenge significantly. 
 
Isolating mechanisms: Freiling and Huth (2005) describe how isolating mechanisms 
makes it difficult to make effectively use of benchmarking. The mechanism is explained 
as a lack of transparency between structures and activity networks, making it very 
difficult to identify the true cause-effect of the identified gaps. 
 
Balancing innovation and imitation: There is a continuous challenge in keeping up the 
important innovative and future driven perspective in a company. As benchmarking could 
be interpreted as a sort of imitation process that saves resources compared to an 
innovation process, it may represent a pitfall (Freiling and Huth, 2005). Watson (1993) 
emphasize that benchmarking is not about copying others, but rather adopting the best 
practices to your own business, strategy and philosophy. 
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These theories and the similarities to IO will be revisited in later chapters when 
attempting to develop a new maritime asset management and battle the inherent 
obstacles. 
2.3 MILITARY THEORY 
2.3.1 Unified understanding 
According to Cramton (2002) common understanding is the knowledge that the different 
stakeholders share deliberately. All parties should have the common situational 
understanding (Reitan and Pålhaugen, 2004). In the Norwegian Naval Academy, 
leadership and organizational effectiveness is highlighted through education and training. 
An important principal is called “mission centered leadership”. The principal is based on 
a unified understanding of the goal and the leader’s intentions. In order for a highly 
complex and dynamic military operation to be effective, one has to abandon the 
traditional detailed plans and highly hierarchical organizations. One needs to 
communicate the intentions and the common goal, and leave it to the local leaders to act 
and change based on the dynamic variables. However, there should be an acceptance that 
the operations are managed with regards to the medium to long term perspective in a 
centralized, well informed multi discipline team. In the setting of IO there are some 
apparent parallels to this principal. The different stakeholders of a maritime operation, 
even if they have different roles and business areas needs to understand and serve the 
common goal and value creation for all. Emphasis should be put on understanding and 
accepting the intentions of the operation and how each individual can help to create value 
for each other. In order to utilize this concept one needs to trust each other, rely on the 
level of competence and sound judgment (FMU, 2003).  
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2.3.2 Network centered warfare 
Network Centered Warfare (NCW) has no short or simple definition. It is in many ways 
the Norwegian army’s parallel to IO and as such has a broad and diversified 
understanding. Reitan and Pålhaugen (2004) have distinguished the principal into six 
categories which is very similar to the approach to IO. The categories are briefly 
described below, but are more extensively elaborated in the analyses part of this report. 
The categories are: 
Network organization: Flexible and optimal use of resources and robust organizations. 
Decentralization: Effective change management to dynamic operations, local decisions 
based on local live information without detailed governance under normal situations. 
Centralization: Coordinated decisions and information overview. 
Common situational awareness: Enhanced effectiveness and quality decisions. 
Common intent: Speedy decision process and synergetic effects. 
Geographical independence: Increased flexibility and robustness of organization. 
 
 
Figure 2: The modern theater of war – Network centered warfare 
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2.4 OSV TECHNOLOGY AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
As the main assets in this study are advanced OSV and the subject is maritime operations, 
there is a need for presenting some brief outlines of the situation. In the 1960s -1990s 
vessels were highly special purpose built and operated. E.g. a traditional fishing vessel 
was built for one kind of fishing, another for fabrication and one for transport over vast 
distances. Today a modern fishing vessel are able to utilize many kinds of fishing 
methods, they can process the fish onboard, freeze it and pack it ready for transportation 
by trailers or airplanes. This development is the result from the required level of 
efficiency and cost effective solutions. One can also identify the same multipurpose 
development in the OSV fleet. They started out as traditional fishing vessels and were 
converted to carry casings and pipes. Then they were modified to carry liquids in bulk, 
operate large cranes and winches, Remote Operated Vehicles (ROV) by the use of 
dynamic positioning systems etc. The vessels have developed over the years to include 
many areas of utilization in order to minimize down time and to replace some of the 
Mobile Offshore Units (MOU). The development has made the vessels highly complex 
and has put new requirements of knowledge and training for the crew and onshore 
managers. The maritime management companies have undertaken the same kind of 
development. The largest OSV companies in Norway origins from the fishing industry 
and has adapted to the market and available resources. Often the senior managers are 
former fishing vessel captains within their own company and has limited or no 
knowledge of the petroleum industry, offshore technology or organizational theory.  
 
Prior to the era of the OSV market, maritime industry was mainly concerned with carry 
passengers and cargo over vast distances. Due to the lack of communications technology 
the vessel was left for themselves for weeks at a time. The complex tasks that the modern 
OSV fleet undertakes today require a different approach to maritime management and 
maritime law. The vessels are no longer just a hull and simple machinery, but have 
developed to be advanced precision tools for complex jobs in the subsea market. 
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Figure 3: Offshore Support Vessels 
 
The literature research in this study has not identified any in-depth research of the 
effectiveness of maritime management within the petroleum industry. There seems to be 
little or no research concerning the opportunities and limitations of implementing IO in 
the maritime context. However, the developments of the last years have created the need 
for documenting the OSV operational environment and describe a path for optimization. 
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3 Scientific Methods 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
Ringdal (2001) defines scientific methodology as “plans and techniques used to give 
answers to research questions”. The first step of obtaining the answers in this study was 
an initial literature review into the field of integrated maritime operations. The 
perspective was cooperation and collaboration between the vessel, the operator and the 
onshore management. After an extensive search period it was discovered that there was 
almost no specific research on the topic. Due to this fact it was decided to take an 
exploratory research approach. According to Brown and Suter (2012) exploratory 
research is used to understand an unclear situation, where one strives to connect different 
factors in order to get insight and ideas. Some typical types of exploratory (or qualitative) 
research methods are case studies, depth interviews and literature search. In this 
particular study all of these methods will be utilized to reach the objective. The methods 
are further described in the following chapters. 
 
In order to facilitate the study of maritime assets and operations a cooperation agreement 
with a modern OSV company was made. Both vessels, its crew and on-shore 
management team were available for observation and interviews. Full access was given 
to operational procedures and their safety management system.  A cooperation agreement 
with an IO consultant company served as the knowledge hub of implementing IO. There 
was also an agreement with an operator in order to bring their perspective into 
consideration of the study. 
3.1.1 Literature search 
Literature research is a cost and time effective method in obtaining a theoretical overview 
and a current situational understanding of the subject to be studied (Brown & Suter, 
2012). In order to reduce the level of uncertainty and increase the quality a standard have 
been set. The literatures to be reviewed are scientific papers at the research library of 
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Universities and from the relevant companies and their partners. Google Scholar will also 
be used to locate relevant information. Throughout the study, care will be taken to 
distinguish the serious literature from the not so serious. 
3.1.2 Interview 
According to Ringdal (2001) the objective of the interview is to gather information and 
knowledge about the research questions and one way to do this is the so called flexible 
approach. The qualitative depth interviews are not pre fixed in structure, but can change 
direction and focus based on the answer and information obtained during the process. The 
persons interviewed were selected based on their work tasks, level of experience and the 
company they belong to. The interviews were made by phone or a physical meeting. 
Figure 4 lists all the persons interviewed. 
 
Business sector Position / Title Phone Meeting 
IO consultant  Owner  X 
Research center Business developer  X 
OSVcompany Fleet Manager  X 
OSVcompany Vessel Manager  X 
OSVcompany Project Manager X  
OSVcompany Captain X  
OSV company All crew members in one 
vessel (group interview) 
 X 
Operator 1 Company repr. X  
Operator 2 Company repr.  X 
Norwegian Maritime 
Authority 
Head of Section  X 
Figure 4: List of interviewed personnel 
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Recording or videotaping the interviews was considered, but since a significant amount 
of the relevant information could be seen as critical towards own operations, it was 
considered probable that it could restrict the interviewees in sharing their knowledge. In 
addition to individual interviews, there was also an interview of a focus group. In this 
setting several persons with similar knowledge was gathered together in a group and 
interviewed. According to Brown & Suter (2012) this method can produce results due to 
group interaction. The individuals often build on each other and feel comfortable as 
others are coming out with similar thoughts. It could also lead to productive discussions 
and identifications of either misunderstandings or difference of opinions. On the other 
hand it could also result in biased information if no consideration is taken to which 
individuals are to be part of the group. In this study the individuals were the crew of one 
of the vessels. This crew consisted of subordinates and their leaders onboard. It was 
probable that the subordinates could be scared of reprisal by their leaders if they were 
critical or that the leaders held back in an attempt to lead by a loyal example. Therefore 
there was a need for clarification of the intentions of the interview. As Brown & Suter 
(2012) describes the method has its flaws, in particularly towards interpreting the 
statements and discussions. There is a risk of being biased in recording the result of the 
discussions. If not conscious on this issue one might record the things one wants to hear 
or are looking for. 
 
The individuals that were interviewed where given the liberty of speaking freely about 
issues that makes their work tasks and operations ineffective, and particular towards 
organizational matters. Afterwards they were invited to give their view on some of the 
issues identified during the case studies. The third part of the interview was an invitation 
to suggest solutions for better information exchange, collaboration between the different 
parties etc. Despite of these focused questions there has been a carefulness of not asking 
leading questions. 
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3.1.3 Case analysis 
Yin (2003) describes case studies as a “present time study of a phenomenon in its natural 
context”. He also recommends the method for answering the questions of “Why” and 
“How”. However, he has criticized the method due to its microscopic tendency as only a 
few cases are studied in the research. In this particular study one can with certainness 
conclude that the issues identified in the cases studied applies for the specific company. 
However, one can only with a certain degree of probability conclude that it will also 
apply for similar companies within the same field of business. The company chosen in 
this case is among the five largest companies in its business field in Norway, and has 
similar operations and equipment as the comparable companies. By the undersigned’s 
extensive insight into the maritime industry in Norway, the level of uncertainty related to 
studying only one OSV company is reduced. It is also verified by the NMA that this 
particular OSV company is among the five largest in Norway and are facing comparable 
challenges as to the rest of the OSV industry. 
 
Yin (1994) recommended four elements in order to produce a high quality case study: 
• Show that the analysis relied on all the relevant evidence. 
• Include all major rival interpretations in the analysis. 
• Address the most significant aspect of the case study.  
• Use the researcher's prior, expert knowledge to further the analysis. 
According to Alvarez et al (1990) the case study has been widely in use for critical 
thinking. In this particular study the ability to have a critical mind set and revolt the 
traditional and deeply incorporated view has been an important factor. 
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3.2 THE CASES TO BE STUDIED 
3.2.1 Case 1 – A maintenance and modification project 
During the winter of 2009-2010 a well stimulation vessel was undertaking a 30-year 
class1 renewal dry docking. The vessel was also to be modified with new engines, 
dynamic positioning system and a modern maneuvering system. The duration of the 
project was planned to be 5 weeks, but the result was 10 weeks before normal operations 
were in effect. The project also went over budget. This case will be a study of what went 
wrong, and if the identified causes could have been mitigated by the implementation of 
the IO approach. 
3.2.2 Case 2 – The Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
As a response to international requirements the OSV company has tried to implement a 
Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for some of their vessels. They 
describe the implementation part to be highly frictional. During the project there has been 
a lack of coordination and cooperation between the maritime and petroleum management 
causing a delayed and inefficient implementation of the SEEMP. This study will identify 
the issues that caused the perceived problems and analyze if the IO approach could have 
altered the outcome. 
3.3.3 Case 3 – An unscheduled critical maintenance operation 
There seems to be too little involvement by the maritime management during normal 
operations, but when technical or operational elements start to fail, they take over the 
show immediately as the operators leave the picture. This may cause confusion, 
inefficient and risky situations for all stakeholders. If the first two case studies does not 
produce the necessary insight or there is a need to verify the findings, a third case has 
been planned that could complement the collection of knowledge. The third case consists 
                                                 
1 The classification society’s renewal of the vessels hull and machinery certificates 
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of an actual critical break down of supply vessel’s main propulsion thruster and the 
organizational implications in the following maintenance operation. During normal 
operations everything may seemingly be in order, but when a critical situation occurs the 
underlying problems emerge and hit the operations with full power. The study of this 
case will focus towards the frictional elements that reduced the efficiency of the 
operation. The focus will be on the inter-organizational collaboration and the conflict of 
interests between them. In this particular case the organizational bodies involved were the 
vessel management, the operator, the insurance company, the classification society, the 
flag state, the condition monitoring service supplier and the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM). 
 
PART THREE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4 Results 
In this section the results from the three cases are presented. The cases are operational 
events that have been analyzed based on the relevant documentation from the OSV 
company, the actual participation of the undersigned and the interviews. 
 
4.1 CASE 1- A MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION PROJECT 
Normally a vessel is compounding maintenance days over the contract period. E.g. one 
day of maintenance along the quay is earned each month. When necessary the vessel can 
cash out the accumulated maintenance days. However, if a technical failure shuts down a 
system and the vessel has to be taken out of operations it will go off-hire. When a vessel 
is taken off-hire it loses all its income and has to cover all administrative expenses. In 
order to cash out the maintenance days and avoiding off-hire, the maintenance task has to 
be planned for and agreed upon with the petroleum operators. It is often very difficult to 
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spend the maintenance days in order to stay on-hire, for several reasons. E.g. you have to 
plan for parts, special tools, service engineers, crew change, yard and quay facilities and 
time these elements with the when the operators can release the vessel. Unfortunately the 
planning of such a maintenance task often has to be done many times over. Plan changes 
as unexpected supply needs on the MOU require the vessel to stay operational, parts are 
going astray and service engineers are being booked for other jobs as yours got cancelled. 
The only way to be certain of no cancellation is to take the vessel off-hire, but then lose 
0.5-1.0 million NOK per day. 
 
This case is based upon a maintenance and modification (MM) project during the winter 
of 2009\2010. The undersigned has firsthand knowledge of the situation, functioning both 
as the Project Manager for the MM and this particular vessel’s Manager. There will first 
be a short presentation of the vessel, then follows a description of the organization and 
management structure. The main part will be a listing of the relevant problems identified 
in the study. The focus of this case review is to identify and describe the difficulties that 
could relate to organizational and system factors. 
4.1.1 Background 
The well stimulation vessel, one of the few of its kind, was built in 1981. She is owned 
and managed by the OSV company and holds a long term contract with a major 
petroleum operator. The vessel is classed in Lloyds Register and carries a flag from 
Bahamas. The vessel is normally under daily supervision and utilization by operator’s 
local management in Denmark. If there are any problems or internal affairs the Vessel 
Manager in the OSV company is contacted, either by the vessel or the operator, and takes 
over the operational particulars. If there are no urgent problems with the operation, there 
may not be any contact between the vessel and OSV company for several days. 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
In the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 28 
 
 
Figure 5: The well stimulation vessel 
In 2010 she was due for the 30-years class renewal dry docking. At the same time major 
modification tasks were planned. This involved the replacement of auxiliary engines, the 
maneuvering system and the entire Dynamic Positioning (DP) system. In addition to the 
large modification tasks there were about 200 work orders of various kinds. 
4.1.2 The managerial situation 
In the OSV company the responsibility of the operation and maintenance management 
are dedicated to the Vessel Manager (VM). The VM is the point of contact towards the 
operator. In supporting the VM, the OSV company has a Crew Coordinator, an 
accountant, a purchaser and Quality Health Safety and Environment (QHSE) coordinator. 
The VM reports to the Fleet Manager and the Chief Operation Officer. All of these 
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persons are given a fleet of vessels to attend within their field of expertize and level of 
authority. However, the composition of the fleet varies and there really are no 
consistencies. E.g. the VM has four vessels dedicated to him, the Crew Coordinator has 
five different vessels, the Purchaser has three other vessels and so on and so forth. The 
communication between the different coordinators and managers is based upon phone 
calls, e-mails or instant messaging software tools. Basically the only criteria for placing 
the respective vessels into the different fleets of responsibilities are the location of the 
offices. There is an unwritten policy of trying to minimize a mixture of teams across vast 
geographical distances. 
 
The operator has three persons involved in managing the operation. Onboard you have 
the Supervisor, which is responsible of managing the stimulation task at the installation 
site and liaising with the Captain. On shore you have the Vessel Operation Manger who 
coordinates all people involved with the vessel and has the responsibility of facilitating 
the operation. This person reports to the operator’s Country Manager. The vessel has 33 
persons on board. 11 of which is the maritime crew lead by the Captain. The 22 other are 
operator’s personnel running the stimulation equipment. The Captain is Norwegian, the 
rest of the crew is from Poland and the operator’s personnel consist of people from 
several other nationalities. 
4.1.3 The project 
The 30 year class renewal of the vessel’s certificates was coming up. This involves over 
100 work orders and inspections related to the vessel’s hull and structure. In addition to 
this the maintenance task of machinery and equipment resulted in hundred more work 
orders. The project was budgeted to approx. 25 million NOK and duration of 5 weeks. 
The operator also had various work orders for their specialized equipment on board, but 
planned their work separately from the OSV company. 
The project had to commence between the spring of 2009 and no later than January 2010. 
The end of this window marked the due date of the vessel’s certificates and was not 
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negotiable by the classification society. Due to the nature of the project and the size of 
the vessel the dry docking locations were limited. Eight different yards were invited to 
offer their services, several of them in Norway. It was clear that the best options were in 
Denmark and Sweden. The operator was making the most out of an active stimulation 
market and would not confirm any date to start the project. The startup date was 
continuously postponed. As there was no confirmed time for dry docking it became 
difficult to plan and confirm the yards. The yard could not keep the slot available as other 
companies were pressing for works as well. This added to the uncertainty in many 
aspects. Due to particular work orders it was necessary to dock the vessel during the 
warm part of the year. Despite of this being clearly communicated to the operator it was 
not understood or adhered to. Finally the docking was executed during the winter and 
Christmas holiday of 2009/2010. The planning of this project was not very effective. The 
final budget was overrun by 100% and the project’s duration was prolonged from 5 
weeks to 10 weeks. Through an extensive review of the project several issues have been 
identified that could explain this result. The issues describe obstacles and situations that 
are related to communication and cooperation in both the planning and execution of the 
project. The identified problems indicates a lack of integrated planning and operation, 
however this will be further analyzed in later chapters. 
4.1.4 Identified problems and obstacles 
A: Lack of confirmation of time for execution 
The OSV company urged to commence the dry docking before the summer vacation of 
2009. The temperature, daylight and transportation opportunities were all favorable for a 
smooth operation. However, there was no confirmation from the operator to release the 
vessel for the project. The market was high and the operator would not miss out on high 
pay projects. The OSV company had no insight into the operators’ plans or priorities and 
was depended on continually asking for information and confirmations. The start-up of 
the project was postponed several times by weeks at a time, until finally commencing in 
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the end of November 2009. The continuous postponements led to many difficulties that 
have been identified and listed below: 
 
A1: As there was no confirmation of date, a fixed contract with a particular yard could 
not be made. There was a high building activity in the market at the time and nearly all 
yards were pre booked. 
  
A2: With no fixed place to undertake the project, there were no place to send the parts 
and special tools. A consequence of this was suboptimal storage of parts with respect to 
the ambient conditions e.g. moisture and temperature. It was difficult to prepare for a fast 
shipment to the actual location and the yard did not manage to prepare the equipment in 
time. 
 
A3: With no fixed time to perform the project it was not possible to have the OEM 
specialists confirmed attendance. The service engineers that finally came had to be 
replaced several times and did not have the required competence. There was also a need 
for extra crewmembers during the dry docking for tank cleaning etc., but the hiring 
process could not commence as the time was not fixed. In addition to all of these factors 
the time for docking had to comply with the availability of the classification societies’ 
surveyors and the flag state inspectors. All of these issues made planning and 
coordination challenging, leaving the vessel and the project team with suboptimal 
solutions. 
 
B: Winter dry docking: 
When the final confirmation of releasing the vessel was received, i.e. the operators order 
to commence the project it was decided to dock in the end of November. Due to the 
winter season and Christmas holiday the completion date was set to after New Year’s 
Eve. The following challenges have been identified in relation to this factor: 
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B1: The temperature was 10-15 degrees below centigrade. The cold weather delayed the 
hardening process of the paintwork, particularly the side and bottom tanks. These parts of 
the hull had to be insulated and heated by external fans in order for the paint to dry. Not 
only was these additional services costly, but it delayed the startup of other work orders. 
 
B2: Even if there is a freezing ambient temperature, the seawater normally surrounding 
the hull heats up the vessel to some degree above the freezing point. As the hull was out 
of water during dry docking, the temperature in the engine room was subzero. Residual 
water in valves, pipes and heat exchanges froze, expanded and cracked the materials. For 
a 30 year old vessel original equipment is not in production anymore and it is expensive 
and time consuming to get a hold of new parts. The alternative is to adapt the equipment 
to fit new parts or refurbish the old. The icy conditions generated many new work orders 
and slowed down the progress of the predefined tasks. The problem was also causing 
similar damages to the operator’s equipment on board. There was no particular 
cooperation or communication about these issues before or during the project. 
 
B3: During this Christmas there was 70 cm of snow in north of Denmark. Combined with 
the wind the snow caused blocked roads. Even if a snow truck removed it, it blew back 
over the road 15 minutes later. 80 % of the yard workers were not able to travel to work. 
They were snowed in for several days. The work was halted and all the service engineers 
from the OEM were on standby, but still at normal hourly rates. Even if this was an act of 
nature, the effect on the project could have been reduced if there was a higher focus on 
integrated planning and execution of the project. Contingency plans, experience sharing 
and joined work capacities could have limited the consequences. This will be further 
analyzed in later chapters. 
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B4: Christmas season and the holiday caused other challenges as well. Even if the crew is 
onboard working as normal all other personnel attending the project had planned with a 
Christmas vacation. This led to an ineffective use of time at the yard. The temporarily 
personnel had limited competence and no real handover with those leaving. 
 
B5: The hotels closed down for the season so there was a challenge accommodating all 
service engineers. Transportation of emergency spare parts or personnel was difficult due 
to the Christmas holiday. Both operator and the OSV company struggled with the 
logistics, but did not attempt to solve the problems together or share the different 
capacities or experiences. 
 
B6: A Vessel Manager has a fleet of vessels to support and manage. Normally the 
colleagues of the Vessel Managers in the OSV company take over his other work tasks 
during an intensive dry docking. During Christmas vacations this is not easy to facilitate 
as they are all on vacation. The result was that the vessel manager had to combine 
managing the project of the well stimulation vessel in addition to supporting his other 
vessels. There was also limited support from other business areas in the OSV company 
during the Christmas season, adding to the vessel managers work load. 
 
C: Communication: 
There was a lack of communication and integration of plans across the organizations. 
This led to loosing important information, several last minute changes and missing out on 
small windows of opportunities. The effect and how to potentially mitigate them will be 
discussed in later chapter, but the issues identified during the case study are presented 
below: 
 
C1: Preparation of work task was incomplete as there were misunderstandings between 
the vessel, the operator and the OSV company. The lack of communications resulted in 
equipment not being ready. E.g. tanks had not been cleaned, seals had not been checked 
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for leakages and so on and so forth. Some preparation tasks were initiated by the OSV 
company, some by the crew and some by the operator, however not coordinated or 
controlled. When entering the yard this was discovered and caused delayed parts as 
orders were sent out too late. The lack of coordinated preparations added to the service 
engineers’ and the specialist’s work load. 
 
C2: The work list from the operator was not presented to the OSV company prior to the 
docking. As the OSV company was oblivious to the operators work list, the opportunity 
of synergetic effect in planning and execution was lost. Instead there was conflicting 
interests of having the space, resources and equipment to perform the tasks. It also 
resulted in conflicts with regards to how, when and which equipment to be removed and 
transported to the yard’s work shop. The operator did not send their work list to the yard, 
but handed them over as an ad hoc work list during the docking. This made it difficult for 
the yard to distinguish between the orders with regards to tracking costs and invoicing. It 
also made it difficult for the OSV company and the operator to track and verify their 
actual costs during the yard stay. 
 
C3: During the project there was a complete crew change onboard. There was a 
difference in motivation, competence and poor communication between the two shifts. 
During the crew change, information got lost due to poor handovers. This led to 
misunderstandings, blaming and an unconstructive competiveness.  
 
C4: The communication to the OEM service support office was poor. One example is 
highlighted. In order to tune the engine after the overhaul, it was necessary to acquire 
information about the correct timing of the fuel injection. The service engineer at the 
main office told the onsite vessel manager; “I have the information at the desk in front of 
me, but as you have been using yard personnel to some of the task related to the engine 
instead of us, I will not give you the information, good bye!” This statement was given 
despite of using the same OEM in other tasks onboard during this project. Other similar 
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miscommunications and lack of cooperation resulted in parts not being sent on time and 
experienced service engineers and specialists not being prioritized to this particular 
project. 
 
C5: A major challenge during this project was the mounting of a flawed part on the bow 
thruster. It was not discovered prior to docking out and the vessel was nearly back in 
service before the alarm was raised. The Chief Engineer had discovered that the oil level 
in the oil seal tank was increasing, but did not inform anyone of the fact. Two days later 
the vessel manager saw the same situation and concluded that if the seal was leaking, the 
propeller shaft could function as a pump and force sea water into the tank. This turned 
out to be correct and the vessel had to be dry docked again in order to fix the thruster. 
The problem now was that the previous yard was occupied and a contract had to be made 
with a new yard. The vessel was docked again after sailing to the other side of the 
country. The new part was verified to be correct by the OEM, but during mounting it was 
discovered that the new part had the same misalignment as the previous one. Two days 
later the correct machined part was located and the vessel could finally continue its 
normal operations. Specific problems identified during this major challenge: 
 
C5.1: Initiative towards good and open communication between the site crew and the 
OEM office was met by reluctance and hostility at the OEM Office. A large insurance 
claim case was building up and the OEM wanted to protect themselves and started to 
limit their normal service functions. 
 
C5.2: It was discovered that both the crew and the client personnel on board was 
withholding information for self-benefits. Their shift was coming to an end and they did 
not want to head out to the high seas for only five days. They saw it as beneficial for 
themselves if they would still be in dock during the planned crew change. This would 
mean easier transportation possibilities home, reduced probability of any delays and 
during the evenings they could all go out on the town and relax. This view led to 
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important information not being communicated to either the operator or the VM and in 
some cases problems were raised that was not real or of any significance. The lack of 
common understanding and feeling of ownership to the project will be further discussed 
in later chapters. 
 
C5.3: There was no contingency plan after realizing that the vessel was not operational 
after docking out or after the first initial tests. As a result the only docking alternative was 
on the other side of the country generating a two day transit. No yard was on stand by and 
an entire new cooperation environment had to be established.  
 
C5.4: There were difficulties of making new parts function together with old parts. As 30 
years old electrical components was to “communicate” with a state of the art Dynamical 
Positioning (DP) system several complex errors occurred. It was then discovered that a 
close communication and collaboration path to the OEM specialists were lacking. 
Another experience was made when combining different components of different 
suppliers and the end result does not function. This led to no one taking responsibility to 
make it function and as long as their own equipment was according to the specification, 
their policy was “hands off”. There was a lack of common understanding and unified 
teamwork across suppliers and managers.  
 
C5.5: Due to the problems and delayed completion of the project, the operator missed out 
on attractive new contracts and lost millions of NOK. 
 
C5.6: In normal operations the Captain and Chief Engineer is leading the work, but 
during a dry docking it is the VM who is in charge. It was discovered that during a dry 
docking the onboard leaders’ lack of direct responsibilities, caused them to distance 
themselves from the project. Even after docking out and during the initial live tests at sea 
it was necessary to instruct the Captain to take control for the safe operation of the vessel. 
This indicated a symptom of working as individualists rather than a team. 
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C5.7: As the project was delayed and the communications and cooperation with the OEM 
was breaking up, senior service personnel had to leave in order to attend another project. 
There were no qualitative hand over to the next engineer that came on board, and they 
were not competent to handle the problems. They also stated that they actually had been 
muzzled by their home office as this could be a major warranty claim case. This reduced 
the cooperation environment considerably and limited the exchange of important 
information. 
 
The problems identified in this case study will be further analyzed in chapter 5. 
4.2 CASE 2 – THE SHIP ENERGY EFFICIENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN (SEEMP) 
4.2.1 Background 
When the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC) met for the 62nd time in July 2011, they decided to adopt 
the amendments to MARPOL2 Annex VI. This made the Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (SMEEP) mandatory for all vessels above 400 gross ton. The ship 
specific SEEMP had to be approved for the OSV vessels no later than during the first 
certificate renewal after 1st January 2013. The purpose of a SEEMP is to have a ship 
specific plan to measure, mitigate and control the environmental footprint of the vessel. 
The effort is mainly operational as technical requirements are handled in other part of the 
rules and regulations. In this project the OSV company teamed up with the Class and 
selected three categories of vessel for which a SEEMP should be developed. These 
categories represented the Anker Handling and Tug Support (AHTS), Construction 
Support Vessels (CSV) and Platform Supply Vessels (PSV). Within these groups there 
are differences, but not as large as between the groups themselves. The plan was to 
                                                 
2 The international mandatory code for the prevention of maritim polution (MARPOL) 
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develop a SEEMP for the vessel groups, adapt them within the group and make them all 
ship specific. 
4.2.2 The Project 
In order to meet the requirements from the international maritime organization the OSV 
company teamed up with the Class. A sub goal of the project was to increase the 
company’s competitiveness with its increased focus on environmental sustainability. The 
project was based on similar studies by the Class and was defined in four steps: 
Planning:  
An important part of the project startup was obtaining the energy consumption situation. 
The OSV company established work groups with key personnel onboard and gathered 
good ideas and experience from the daily operations. They also collected data of different 
energy consumers, and clarified which parameters to measure and how to measure them. 
The results were 49 suggestions of how to reduce the energy consumption. These ranged 
from hull and propeller maintenance to turning off consumers when not in use. The 
different suggestions were ranked according to their effect and the ease of 
implementation. The final action plan consisted of nine measures. 
The OSV company did not invite or include the operators during this process. Their view 
was that this was a local challenge on board the vessel, and that the operators could be 
informed of the results after the project. The OSV company discovered some reluctance 
towards the project by its key crew members onboard. However, when finally starting up, 
the motivation came along. An example of different measures for improvement and the 
estimated effect can be seen below in figure 6. 
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Figure 6: An example of an specific energy saving potential 
As seen in figure 6, measures associated with voyage performance and operations, makes 
up a significant part of the potential saving. In this project the measures within this 
segment are:   
 
Implementation:  
The implementation of the different initiatives is divided into short term and long term 
actions. One of them is to develop procedures of energy management and an 
implementation plan according to the OSV company’s routines and operational pattern. 
However, implementation is not considered a major part of the SEEMP in this case. 
 
Monitoring:  
After the consumption base line has been established the monitoring of fuel consumption 
and NOx emissions starts. If the consumption is over the baseline the reasons for this 
shall be investigated and followed up in order to initiate appropriate actions. If there are 
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any operational situations that lead to deviating from the economic speed the time and 
reason shall be documented.  
 
Self-evaluation and improvement:  
Even after the SEEMP has been established it will be modified and altered based on the 
experience from implementation and monitoring. The different initiatives will be 
evaluated with respect to the effect of the efforts and how to increase efficiency. If some 
actions do not give the desired effect, it can be abandoned. These elements will function 
in a continuous loop and be improved over time. 
In figure 7 consumption in the different modes are presented. These are the results of 
monitoring and registration of the operation of a PSV. 
 
 
Figure 7: The specific operational mode consumptions 
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4.2.3 Identified problems and obstacles 
Throughout the project various difficulties was identified. The issues are highlighted 
below and discussed further in later chapters. As some of the issues are highly technical, 
there is a need to first explain the functioning of the system in order to understand the 
problem. 
 
A: Operators requirement of running with a closed bus tie breaker: 
A vessel with a class notation of Dynamically Positioned with redundant machinery, have 
two independent main switch boards. E.g. four engine setup with two engines in each 
engine room. On each side you have a main switch board for electrical power. The switch 
boards are connected through a circuit breaker which is normally referred to as the bus-tie 
breaker. If this breaker is closed the switchboards are connected. If it is closed and there 
is a critical failure in one side of the power supply, the breaker will automatically open 
due to a limit of the maximum frequency or voltage deviation. When it opens, the side 
with the fault will be isolated and the functioning side will operate as normal. The 
electrical power system is designed in such a way that the critical consumers are divided 
between the boards. However, the operators does not always allow to run with a closed 
bus-tie, as there has been some situations on the NCS where the bus-tie did not opened, 
causing damage to both sides and a total black-out. Hence, the operators demand that the 
bus-tie has to be open so that a failure cannot influence the functioning side. This leads to 
different issues as described below: 
 
A1: A problem is identified as the vessel has to have enough engines running in both 
engine rooms that can supply the entire vessel single handedly under normal operations. 
This means that at least a total of three engines have to be running at all time. In a closed 
bus-tie scenario it would be enough to have one engine in each room and a third in 
standby. Running with an open bus tie breaker leads to an unnecessary high fuel 
consumption.  
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A2: The issue described above leads to many engines running with low load. This is not 
optimal with regards to the efficiency of the engine. Normally an engine will perform 
most efficiently and produce least amount of emission/kW at 80-90 percent load. If only 
running at 30-40 percent load, soot will build up and cause poor combustion. Over time 
the build-up of soot leaves the engines less efficient as turbo charges becomes less 
effective and the clogging of the fuel injection nozzles. The latter will also generate 
unnecessary maintenance. 
 
A3: Another consequence of too low engine load is the inoperability of the Selective 
Catalysts Reaction (SCR) plant. The NOx-reducing plant uses ammonium to clean the 
emissions from the exhaust, but it needs a temperature exceeding 300 C in order for the 
chemical reaction to start. This is not possible at low loads and the SCR plant shuts down 
automatically, i.e. there is no reduction in NOx emissions. 
 
B: Lack of deck utilization and priorities of cargo 
There is a lack of environmental risk based transportation. I.e. there is no evaluation of 
the environmental consequences of transporting the extra ordinary equipment. 
 
B1: Often the PSV will be ordered to an installation only carrying a single container or 
other minor deck loads. The impression of the Captain is that the vessels do not seem to 
be utilized well enough. 
 
B2: They might also be sent out with less important equipment, which could probably 
have waited until the next planned roundtrip.  
  
C: Waiting on weather 
According the Captain’s interview, they often burn fuel for days waiting for better 
weather next to the installation. 
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C1: The Captain describes how they are ordered to sea, even if there is only a small 
chance of a window opening up for work. He has experienced many times, that they have 
to be on site, waiting on weather for days, instead of waiting at the quay. Fuel is 
consumed and the crew is accumulating fatigue unnecessary. 
 
C2: Normally the vessel will be under the operator’s logistical control and regime. 
However, when the vessel functions as a storage facility off shore, it is the drill-leader’s 
task to handle the local vessel operations. The Captain describes that they often wait for 
days without being efficiently utilized as the drill leader is not under the normal logistical 
control. 
 
D: Speed requirements 
The Operators does not always consider the vessels economic or environmental friendly 
speed when ordering time of arrivals. 
 
D1: The Operator’s marine department plan in some cases with the vessel’s max speed 
capacity, even if they are not able to utilize the saved time upon arrival. In one case the 
vessels were strongly urged to transit from the onshore supply base to the installation at 
full speed. Apparently the cargo was critical to the offshore operation and there was no 
time to loose. However, when arriving at the field site, the vessel was told to standby, due 
to an internal fire exercise on the rig. One and a half hour later the offloading could 
commence. In this particular case, the vessel could have sailed to the rig, making even 
less than economic speed, and still be on site prior to the required time. 
 
E: Onshore trailer replacement 
In some particular cases the Operators are using their transportation resources 
ineffectively with respect to the environment. 
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E1: According to the Captain there have been several situations where critical equipment 
of only a few hundred kilograms had to be transported from one particular supply base to 
another, and then out to the rig site. The reason for the transportation between the supply 
bases is the lack of an available supply vessel. In order to save a couple of hours the 
Operator order the supply vessel to sail along the coast of Norway, all the way to the 
other supply base to pick up the equipment. The vessel is empty and in ballast conditions, 
burning huge amount of fuel on its journey. If the operators allowed for a trailer onshore 
to do the transportation work, and gave more priority to the environmental factor, the 
environmental footprint of that particular operation would be only a few percent of what 
it actually was.  
 
E2: According to the Captain, when the crew experiences these kinds of priorities, their 
motivation to try to reduce the energy consumption onboard is falling. Their 
environmental effort over the last days could be wasted when considering these 
unnecessary round trips.  
 
E3: In these situations there is often a lack of communications between the crew and the 
operator. No explanations for the decisions were given and there was no integration of 
the management onshore. 
 
F: Time for maintenance and environmental initiatives 
As explained earlier, under normal offshore supply contracts the shipping company 
accumulates maintenance days. E.g. each month the companies receive one day to 
maintenance. When planned for and agreed upon by the Operator the shipping company 
can take the vessel out of operation, and perform the necessary maintenance and still stay 
on hire. 
 
F1: The challenge here is to agree upon a fixed day for performing the maintenance. The 
shipping company has to order service engineers and ship parts, and is dependent on a 
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fixed place and date. However, it is very difficult to obtain confirmation of such a date. 
Often the time and place are altered, which create a lot of work for the Vessel Manager. 
There is little or no integration of the shipping company in the operator’s planning and 
the result is cancelations and ineffective maintenance operations. In the SEEMP project 
there are several maintenance initiatives, e.g. polishing of propellers and cleaning of the 
hull, that are difficult to plan. There is no agreement of doing these tasks on hire, so the 
only opportunity is to spend the normal maintenance days or taking the vessel off hire. 
The result is likely to be a postponement of these tasks until the semiannual dry docking 
and thereby reducing the potential environmental effect of these particular measures.  
  
G: There is a continuous threat of off-hire 
As mention above the accumulated maintenance days have to be planned for in order to 
be spend. If not, the vessel is taken off-hire when problems occurs, and lose all of its 
daily income.  
 
G1: The threat of off-hire is sometimes influencing the communication between the 
operator and the shipping company. E.g. if you have a minor oil leak on the aft propeller 
seal box and it is six months until the planned dry docking, the information will not 
always reach the operator. Normally the oil pressure in the seal box has to correspond to 
the external water pressure in order to keep water from the entering the box. If a seal is 
broken, oil will escape to the environment as the pressure inside is slightly higher than 
outside. However, a “trick” is to decrease the internal pressure of the oil box when you 
are at the quay side (when an oil leak is easy to discover in the water), only to increase 
the pressure when returning to open waters. This process might continue to the next 
planned dry docking. If the operator knew about the oil leak, they might order the vessel 
off-hire, which would force the vessel into dry dock. This emergency dry docking would 
then come in addition to the planned docking as parts, engineers etc. are not ready. The 
threat of off-hire, the poor communication and lack of openness in the operation is 
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hurting the environment. These organizational issues are not addressed in the SEEMP 
project. 
 
H: Lack of information of short to medium term planning 
The Captain stated in the interview that they are often waiting at quay side without 
information about the planes for the next couple of days.  
 
H1: This result in constantly staying on alert, having the main machinery ready for use 
and auxiliary engines running. There is therefore no opportunity to connect the power 
supply from shore and unnecessary fuel is consumed in idling mode. 
 
H2: Maintenance tasks that would reduce the energy consumption onboard, e.g. cleaning 
of the main engine’s heat exchangers are not commenced. This is a result of no 
indications of when the vessel is needed again. 
 
H3: The lack of information and openness about the operator’s plans are hindering 
environmental initiatives. The vessel manager has to establish contact with the operator 
in order to obtain any information. Often the answers are given too late in order to 
establish a team of service engineers or having the necessary parts and tools shipped to 
the vessel. 
 
I: Implementation and organizational factors 
Based on the material analyzed and the interview of key personnel there has been 
identified a lack of focus towards organizational factors.  
 
I1: There is no clear plan to mitigate the organizational obstacles, which might hinder the 
implementation of the different initiatives in the project. 
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I2: A document is produced (SEEMP), as required by international maritime law, but 
there is no clear plan of how to implement the initiatives in practice.  
 
I3: The OSV company has not included the operators in the project and the results may 
not be in line with the operator’s priorities and environmental plans. Statements in the 
interviews such as “the main work has to be done on board”, might indicate the lack of 
understanding of the influence by the organizational and system factors in this project.  
 
I4: The operators have not taken any particular initiatives towards the OSV company 
with respect to the new requirements of MARPOL, but is focusing towards their internal 
procedures and internal planning.  
These issues will be further discussed in the analysis in chapter 5. 
4.3 CASE 3- THE UNSCHEDULED CRITICAL MAINTENANCE OPERATION  
This third case to be studied is an unscheduled critical maintenance operation of a supply 
vessel’s main propulsion thrusters. This case study is particularly interesting with regards 
to the conflict of interests between the stakeholders, and how this factor can influence the 
result. The study therefore aims to complement the information from the first two cases. 
4.3.1 Background 
The vessel is a PSV engaged in the North Sea, serving a long term contract with a major 
operator. During the summer of 2009 the PSV was working outside Ålesund in Norway. 
A phone call was made to the vessel’s management office informing of metal shavings in 
their port side main propulsion thruster. The vessel could not continue working and it was 
immediately decided that the vessel had to be dry-docked and undertake a full 
overhauling of the damaged thruster. The classification society, insurance company, 
clients and senior management was notified. Parts and service engineers from the OEM 
in Finland was ordered. The vessel faced a two week off-hire of 2 million NOK and 
overhauling costs of 3 million NOK. The condition monitoring system had failed to 
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predict the break down. When the vessel was docked, the decision was made to also 
check the starboard thruster. The same scenario was revealed. There were large metal 
shavings in this side as well, but not to the same extent. Additional parts for a second 
thruster had a 12 week delivery time. The study of this case aims to identify the frictional 
elements that reduced the operational efficiency and the organizational elements that 
diminished the communication and collaboration between the involved parties of interest. 
 
  
 
Figure 8: The platform supply vessel before docking 
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4.3.2 The particular stakeholders 
Due to the complexity in the conflict of interests between the stakeholders, it is necessary 
to briefly describe the stakeholders. 
The OSV company: The vessel’s management company which is responsible for the safe 
operation of the vessel and all maritime affairs. The responsible person in this company 
for this particular operation is the Vessel Manager (VM). 
The operator: The oil field operator that has the vessel on contract. The operator is 
running the daily operation of the vessel and has the responsibilities for the petroleum 
affairs of the vessels operation. The responsible person is the Company’s Representative 
(CR). 
OEM: Is the Original Equipment Manufacturer of the main propulsion thruster, situated 
in Finland. The responsible person is the Service Manager (SM) 
The yard: The yard in Rørvik, which undertakes all the work and support to the vessel 
and the OEM. 
H&M: The hull and machinery insurance company for the vessel. The responsible person 
is the Insurance Surveyor (IS) 
CM: Is the condition monitoring supplier for the OSV company. The responsible person 
is the Customer Account Manager (CAM) 
The Class: Is the vessels classification society that approves the works and issues all 
necessary certificates. The responsible person is the Class Surveyor (CS) 
4.3.3 The Operation 
In order to fully understand the identified problems and obstacles of this operation it is 
also necessary to account for the main sequence of events, the different opportunities and 
decisions taken. The main propulsion thruster had a major break down in the upper gear 
house. However, the metal debris contaminated the entire thruster and required a full 
overhaul. This particular thruster can be seen in figures 9. 
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Figure 9: The main propulsion thruster 
During a routine oil filter replacement the Chief Engineer (CE) found large metal 
shavings in the port side main thruster. The finding was reported to the VM by phone and 
pictures were sent by mail. Meanwhile the operations continued as normal. The VM and 
CE went through the last vibration and oil monitoring report without finding any 
indications of a break down developing. A new vibration and oil sample was sent to the 
respective condition monitoring (CM) service providers and a phone call to them was 
made by the VM. The CM had not discovered the inherent breakdown, but recommended 
that the thruster should be disabled. The OEM was contacted and they gave the same 
recommendation. The VM contacted the vessel and informed them of this 
recommendation. The captain answered that it already had been disabled and they were 
operating as normal, but with only one thruster functioning. The VM then contacted the 
operator and informed them of the situation. The operator immediately ordered the vessel 
off-hire and that the problem should be fixed before returning to normal operation.  
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The VM contacted the OEM in order to start the preparation of a spare lower gear and the 
necessary parts to the upper gear. The VM also contacted the insurance company, the 
OSV company’s senior management, the classification society, and started to look for an 
available yard. The only available yard was a new dry dock in Rørvik. It was a small 
inexperienced yard. The service engineers from the OEM arrived and started to 
disconnect the equipment. The insurance surveyor (IS) came and was briefed and he 
documented the situation. During the initial phase of the docking it was decided to also 
check the starboard thruster. The same metal shavings were found there as well. Since a 
second spare unit was 12 weeks away it was decided not to stay in the dock waiting for 
the second parts after finishing the first thruster, but try to sail as normal under careful 
and frequent observation. Two weeks later the vessel was back in operation, but with a 
critical failure developing in starboard thruster.  After 12 weeks the OEM gave the all 
clear signal that the spare unit was ready. The vessel was immediately taken off-hire and 
sailed to the same yard as last time and undertook the same overhauling as before. Two 
weeks later the vessel was back in operation with both thrusters in order. 
4.3.4 Identified problems and obstacles 
By studying these two maintenance operations several issues have been identified that 
relates to communications, cooperation and collaboration between the stakeholders which 
made the operation less efficient, more risky and more costly. The results of the identified 
issues are presented below and further analyzed in chapter 5. 
 
A: Initial information: 
 
A1: The initial finding of large metal shavings in the vessel’s main propulsion unit was 
not immediately informed to the operator and the vessel continued its operations risking a 
total breakdown and collision with the platform. 
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A2: The CM service provider failed to inform the VM that the oil samples they had been 
sending in for analyzes was only checked for lubrication quality, not for machinery 
health. I.e. size, shape or type of metal debris was not analyzed. 
 
A3: The CM had mounted the vibration sensors in the wrong places, not being able to 
identify the problem in the lower gear unit. They were competing with the OEM in 
supplying the same services, and were unable to obtain the necessary information to 
provide a high quality service.  
 
A4: No experienced team from the OSV company was made available to process the 
initial information. Every VM was acting alone and independently. The complex 
maintenance operation was also managed by one single person. 
  
B: Learning from previous incidents:  
B1: The knowledge of similar breakdowns within the OEM was not communicated to the 
OSV company.  
 
B2: Similar breakdowns in the OSV company had not previously been proper 
investigated and the underlying causes had not been identified. 
 
B3: Breakdowns of the main propulsion thrusters were a well-known problem within the 
insurance company, but no measures had been taken to inform the OSV company in 
order to reduce the problem. 
 
B4: The classification society or the flag state did not follow up the causes of the 
incidents, but merely verified that the technical condition was corrected before operation 
startup. 
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B5: The operator has had several incidents with their vessels main propulsion thrusters, 
but had not made any attempt to mitigate the problem. 
 
C: The planning and execution of the docking project: 
C1: There were no available yards and there was not a contingency plan for docking any 
of the 67 vessels in their fleet. If a situation occurred everyone started the planning from 
scratch.  
 
C2: The VM, the Captain and the Docking Master at the yard were all inexperienced in 
their respective positions and responsibilities, but this fact was not mitigated or discussed 
in any circumstances. 
 
C3: The yard did not have the quality or capacity to undertake the operation in an 
efficient manner. 
 
C4: The location of the yard was in Rørvik, far from high quality maintenance facilities. 
The yard was simple and inexperienced in docking a modern PSV. 
 
C5: The dry dock was half an hour drive to the yard which increased the need for 
logistical planning drastically.  
 
C6: Procurement, manning and logistical issues stole focus from the vessel manager, they 
could have saved several days if supported by the OSV main office or even the operator’s 
extensive logistical centers. 
 
C7: Too many detailed orders from the higher management level in the OSV company. 
This led to undermining the local management and caused delayed work. 
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C8: There was no real interest by any stakeholder to investigate the incident and establish 
preventive actions.  
 
C9: The remote location of the yard made local infrastructure, power outage, 
transportation of parts, etc. a significant obstacle in the normal operation. The problems 
were not mitigated through communication or planning. 
 
D: The cooperation between the stakeholders 
D1: The response from the thrusters OEM after the breakdown was vague and far in 
between. The issue of a potential insurance claim was the direct cause of this situation. 
 
D2: Communication failed as there were barriers related to economics and liability. 
 
E: The conflict of interests: 
E1: The yard was near to bankruptcy and had limited spare parts and special tools.  
Everything had to be ordered after prepayment was cleared. This was not communicated 
before the docking and caused several days of delay. 
 
E2: The information concerning the discovery of the metal shavings in the second 
thruster was kept secret, as this could lead to the vessel being off-hire for months until the 
next spare thruster was ready. This limited the important information flow between the 
vessel management, the operator, the class and the insurance company. 
 
E3: There was a no unified understanding of the real situation concerning the second 
thruster and the different stakeholders had different interests in the outcome: 
 
E3.1: The operator needed the vessel to be fit for operation, back in operation as quickly 
as possible, but left the vessel off-hire and was not economical liable. 
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E3.2: The insurance company was looking for negligence and carelessness in order to 
increase the deductible in the final claim. The insurance of losses connected to the off-
hire comes into effect after two weeks, so they were interested in that the vessel kept 
sailing after the first repair. This meant that they could start a new insurance case for the 
second thruster and then start counting the deductible off-hire days all over again. 
 
E3.3: The yard had increased all costs and rates in order to survive their short term 
financial problems. They were interested in prolonging the maintenance operations as this 
would increase their income. 
 
E3.4: The classification society was mostly interested in that the problems were corrected 
before commencing normal operations again. 
 
E3.5: The condition monitoring suppliers had focus on not being blamed for not 
discovering the inherent break down. 
 
E3.6: The thruster’s OEM was interested in blaming the break down on misalignment by 
the installer (new building yard) or operational error. They cut all communication for 
several months due to their fright of being held accountable for costs. 
 
E3.7: The OSV company was interested in that both breakdowns were accepted as 
unforeseen and could be reclaimed with the insurance company, and that the vessel was 
allowed to operate as normal after the first breakdown and waiting for the second parts. 
In order to achieve this, the insurance company had to be convinced that the breakdowns 
were accidental and without any influence to prevent it by the vessel or management. The 
class, flag state and the operator had to be convinced that the damaged second thruster 
was working well enough to function until the spare part was ready. The risk of a total 
breakdown leading to a collision with the platform or the increase in repair costs had to 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
In the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 56 
be mitigated. However, this was a relevant scenario which would have set the vessel off-
hire for months and a significant reduction in the insurance claim. 
 
F: The motivation of the crew: 
F1: During the final tests the thruster made noises that seemingly were louder than 
normal. Even if the noise was later “cleared” by the OEM, several of the crew 
highlighted that it was faulty and that it could break down at any time. The experienced 
engine crew confirmed that this was normal after an overhauling, but the other crew 
members constantly claimed that it should be opened up again and inspected. It became 
evident that some of the crew members did not desire to return to normal operations, but 
wanted to work the normal days in the dry dock and relax in the town during the 
evenings. 
The identified problems will be analyzed in chapter 5. 
4.4 INTERVIEWS 
The interviews were made according to the list presented in chapter 3. For practical 
reasons some were made by phone and others by an actual meeting. The interviews 
basically consisted of three parts. The first part focused on the understanding of IO in 
general, the second part was focused towards the case studies and the last part was an 
invitation to suggest improvements in the operational environment. The interview 
subjects ranged from senior management to deck ratings, from the public to the private 
sector and from petroleum operator to OSV management. Some of the results from these 
interviews have already been presented in the identified problems in the case studies.  
4.4.1 IO familiarization 
The operators were the only ones interviewed that actually were familiar with the term 
integrated operation. They had a clear understanding of the principles and the idea. 
However, with regard to the maritime sector operator 1 found IO to be relevant merely in 
logistical terms. During normal operations the vessel was in the IO loop with respect to 
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their operational logistical system, but as soon as the vessel was unable to supply its 
designated function, it was taken off hire and out of the IO loop. This was also the case 
during maintenance operations. The other interviewees were all from the maritime sector 
and none of them were familiar with IO. During the interviews it became apparent that 
the maritime industry is oblivious to IO and its development in the NCS. However, both 
crew members and the OSV senior management acknowledged the need for closer 
cooperation and an increased sharing of updated and filtered information. This result was 
as expected, but surprisingly there was reluctance by operator 1 to foresee any realism of 
implementing IO in the maritime sector. He stated that there were contractual conditions 
that were in effect that made this approach difficult. He argued that the vessel was either 
working for them or not. However, operator 2 had a different view. He believed that the 
maritime sector will have to face the IO work processes and adapt to them some time in 
the future, but that they are not ready for this jet. 
 
The vessel manager stated in his interview that he felt there was a need for more 
integration of the work not only towards the operator, but internally in the company. 
When describing the basic idea of IO to the vessel manager, he replied that it could make 
his and the crew’s work day a lot easier and less frustrating. However, he did not see it as 
likely to obtain this operational environment in practice. He felt the traditional approach 
and contractual segregation of the operation was too strong to be altered. The captain 
stated that if integrated meant that he would be a part of the decisions taken outside the 
local operation, he would be all for it. He was often told what to do, take the local 
responsibility, but without having the onshore backup if necessary. He described a lack of 
operational knowledge on shore and said he had really no one to discuss with if he 
needed a second opinion. The operators had the knowledge, but their team of engineers 
was sometimes difficult to influence. 
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The interviews confirmed the lack of knowledge of IO in the maritime sector and brought 
forward more insight into the current operational problems and their perception of the 
future. 
4.4.2 The case studies 
Several of the interviewees were involved with the actual cases of this study in real time. 
It was therefore necessary to include them in developing the problems presented in the 
previous chapters. A significant part of the interviews was therefore concerned with the 
case studies. The information obtained by these interviews has already been described in 
the respective case results. 
4.4.3 The need for improvement 
After the initial questions concerning IO and the relevant cases, the interviewees were 
given the opportunity to speak freely about everyday challenges. The focus was on 
organizational issues and the cooperation between the operator, the vessel and the OSV 
management. There were a lot of suggestions, but only issues relevant to this study are 
presented in this chapter. The results are organized in three topics. 
4.4.3.1 Planning and execution of maintenance operations 
The operators described a need for the OSV company to improve their planning of 
maintenance operations. They often experienced the vessels being delayed after MM 
projects. Operator 2 suggested that onshore management spent more time on board the 
vessel prior to the projects, in order to fully understand and prepare for the operations. 
The operator had taken the initiative to change the contract in order to reduce this 
problem. They had removed the accumulation of maintenance days and instead took the 
vessel off hire whenever they needed heavy maintenance. The loss of income was 
compensated for in the contract, taking account for a probable amount of necessary days 
within a year. Their theory was that the OSV company would then be more efficient 
during the actual maintenance and not spend unnecessary maintenance days at all. 
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
In the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 59 
 
The vessel manager described a difference between the operator and the OSV managers 
during docking operations. The operator could have 10-15 personnel onsite related to a 
few work orders, while the OSV company had one man handling 200 work orders. The 
OSV senior management said that they had recently started with project support 
engineers that help the vessel managers during large maintenance operations. Normally 
the project department was only concerned with new buildings, but now they also 
supported the ongoing operations. The vessel manager suggested that he would be given 
a team consisting of different business areas to fully address the challenges during a large 
maintenance operation. It was not just technical assistance that was needed. Procurement, 
QHSE and accounting were also limiting his attention to the technical perspective of the 
project. He added that the support would probably be very costly for the OSV company 
in the short term. However, he believed that the saved losses would be greater than the 
direct costs. The crewmembers suggested that they should be included in meetings, not 
just be given simple individual tasks. They claimed that their local knowledge was 
ignored and that this actually led to losses in cost and time.  
 
These suggestions sprung out from experiences in previous projects and verified that the 
issues identified in the case studies were real. How they can be mitigated will be 
discussed in later chapters. 
4.4.3.2 Offshore technology and the operational involvement 
Operator 2 believed there was a need to improve the OSV managers’ understanding of 
offshore technology. However, he admitted that the operator also had a responsibility to 
include them in briefing and updates in order for them to understand the operational 
framework. The maritime authority addressed this issue as a challenge rising in the 
industry. As the vessel becomes more and more specialized the need for knowledge 
increases. Offshore technology is not included in the international code for Standard of 
Training and Watch-keeping (STCW). However, they verified that according to 
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Norwegian maritime law the OSV managers are responsible for the crew having the 
necessary competence to safely operate and maintain their equipment. The question is if 
the OSV managers have enough knowledge to evaluate what the right competence level 
is within advanced maritime operations. The solution might be a tighter coupling between 
the operator and the maritime management. 
4.4.3.3 Administrative burdens and communications 
The captain onboard suggested reducing communication based on e-mails and paper 
works. He spent much of his time filing papers, writing e-mails and answering the phone. 
Less and less time was available for managing the local operations. Often he had to 
answer the same questions several times from different OSV managers in the same 
company. He also highlighted the lack of onshore involvement in the normal operation 
scenario. The captain suggested that the crew members should be included at an early 
stage in the planning process and when the operation was underway the managers should 
stay more involved and have an updated understanding of the status. To mitigate the 
extensive administrative tasks he recommended keeping this type of work onshore and 
resists the temptation to ask the vessel to help out. He felt that the home office had 
become ineffective as more vessels were added to the fleet. Another constraint as he saw 
it was the availability of the managers. He understood the normal working hours of the 
managers, but claimed this principal to be ineffective with regards to their operations. 
The vessel manager described communication as a challenge. There was too much 
information and it was difficult to know what was relevant or not. It had to be better 
filtered and distributed in another way. 
4.5 The traditional maritime asset management company 
In order to understand the analyses and conclusions later in this study it is necessary to 
briefly describe the current and traditional organization of the OSV maritime 
management companies. The typical business areas are technical, crewing (human 
relations), procurement, QHSE and accounting. These are often divided in separate 
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department according to their business areas and each with a set of coordinators and a 
manager. A traditional organizational chart, however somewhat simplified, has been 
developed and is presented in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: A simplified organizational chart of a typical OSV company 
Based on the case studies, the interviews and the undersigned’s experience from maritime 
asset management other typical problems related to the organization are: 
 
a. Authority is only given to a very few persons which leads to bottlenecking 
decisions and the flow of information. 
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b. Communications flows vertically in the organizations and is often lost or altered 
along the way.  
c. The crew is not involved in making decisions and does not feel ownership to new 
procedures or work tasks being handed over to them. This tendency has increased 
the psychological gap between the vessels and the onshore management. 
d. Administrative task are being handed over to the crew, leaving them less time to 
perform their maritime related tasks without breaking the required hours of rest. 
The increased task level is not compensated with the correct level of manning. 
e. Senior management is often more concerned with managing details in operations 
other than verifying strategic decisions and managing performance. 
f. Experience transfer between departments is difficult. 
g. Regular fixed meetings with “available” staff are ineffective and have often no 
relevant content. 
h. The norm is to obey the operators’ actions and requirements. There is no culture 
for asking critical questions in return or require anything back other than the 
contractual income. This reduces the unified operating environment.  
i. A significant amount of time and money is spent on traveling between offices, 
yard and vessels. 
 
Most of these issues will be further described and attempted to be mitigated in the next 
chapter. 
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5 Result analysis 
In this chapter the results will be analyzed within the frame of the research questions. The 
perspective and focus of the analysis are the maritime organization, the collaboration 
between business areas and inter-organizational communication. The structure will 
follow the research questions. 
5.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
The first question to be addressed is “to what extent IO is currently a part of the OSV 
maritime operational and managerial environment? The approach to answer this question 
is first to see if there is any theoretical knowledge of IO in the maritime operational 
environment. If this is not the case it is necessary to see if the IO principals are in use in 
practice, unknowingly or not. The last highly relevant part of this question is if there 
actually is a need for IO in maritime asset management. 
5.1.1 The knowledge of IO in maritime asset management 
The interviews of maritime OSV personnel, both onshore and on board revealed that the 
term IO was not known nor understood. None of them were familiar with IO and could 
not elaborate on the common understanding of it. However, as they only represented one 
single OSV company it raised uncertainties whether this applied for the entire OSV 
industry or not. In order to reduce the uncertainty factor the interview with the NMA was 
important. This interview confirmed that the OSV companies in general are not familiar 
with or use IO as a tool or philosophy in their approach to operations. NMA stated that 
the management companies had just recently risen to a level of matureness, where they 
could have the capacity of utilizing IO. According to NMA the implementation of the 
International Safety Management (ISM) code has made IO a future scenario also for 
maritime asset management. Prior to the implementation of the ISM code in 1998, the 
operation was more or less in the hands of the captain. The Code has defined the OSV 
company’s responsibilities and liabilities, hence requiring a well described Safety 
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Management System (SMS). System is a key word in the context of this study. The Code 
has required the vessel’s local management and the onshore management to plan, act and 
respond in a systematic way, incorporating not only the vessels, but all the operational 
stakeholders. However, even if important regulatory barriers of implementing IO have 
recently been removed it is still not a natural part of the maritime asset management. 
According to the interview with the IO consultant agency the OSV companies are not 
ready for IO and will face significant challenges when the operators set the same 
requirement of IO compatibility to the maritime industry as they have done to their 
offshore OEM suppliers. However, there is only one operator which has indicated this 
future requirement, other operators have not. Even so it is likely that the operator’s size 
and influence on the market will cause others to follow both nationally and 
internationally. 
 
The interviews also revealed that the on board management and the high level on shore 
management acknowledged the need for many of the same elements that one finds in IO. 
The crew mentioned the need for closer cooperation, sharing of relevant and filtered 
information in real time and a centralized decision handling process. These issues are 
described in the works of Bai & Liyange (2008), Frankel (2008) and Reitan & Pålhaugen 
(2004). So even if the term IO and the status of its implementation in the NCS were not 
known, the understanding of its needs was present and to some extent acknowledged. 
However, despite of this fact there was also reluctance towards any major changes and so 
called “revolutions”. Several of the interviewees indicated exhaustion towards more 
paperwork and administrative burdens as means for improved operations, but desired a 
more common understanding of each other’s situation and reasoning behind the 
decisions. There are few common decision tools and limited involvement of the sharp end 
of the operations. This might lead to a feeling of being overrun; lack of process 
ownership and thereby reluctance to decisions. 
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As expected the operator knew IO well, but the interviewee would only forecast IO as a 
logistical tool in a maritime setting on-hire. He was convinced that the maritime industry 
was not mature enough in order to utilize the IO approach. Despite of this statement, an 
interview with the IO consultant confirmed the other operator’s plan to require IO 
compatibility in offshore operations in the near future. This leaves a question if the 
representative of operator 1 thinks of IO as merely an advanced down-whole operational 
approach to improve the petroleum recovery rate? It might be that operator 1’s 
knowledge of IO was high within his segment, but limited towards other business area 
potentials. It would have improved the analysis if there were more representatives from 
other operators included in the interviews. It is therefore recommended to evaluate at a 
future stage if there still is a need to confirm this perception through a quantifiable 
approach. 
5.1.2 Is there a practical use of IO in maritime asset management? 
Even if there was no theoretical knowledge of IO among the maritime interviewees, it 
was of interest to see if any elements of IO or IP, were actually in use in the practical 
operations, consciously or not.  The identified problems in the three case studies not only 
revealed a lack of IO in the maritime management, but also the operator’s lack of 
incorporating the maritime management in their IO centers. The only exemption of this 
fact is the normal daily logistical operations when everything is functioning as normal. 
However, if a situation occurs that stems from the vessels technical operation, the vessel 
is put off-hire and left out of the logistical IO loop at the operator’s site.  
 
When looking deeper into the difficulties identified in case 1, the maintenance and 
modification project of the 30 year old well stimulation vessel, one can highlight several 
missing elements that indicate lack of the practical use of IO. 
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Communication: 
The communication pathways during the project were erratic and to some degree chaotic. 
The individual dialogues occurred spontaneously and without evaluating the need for 
others to be included. In order to visualize the lack of IO with respect to communication 
the lines of information exchange has been drawn between all operational stakeholders in 
figure 11. Red is representing the operator’s project and perspective, while the blue lines 
are the OSV’s project. 
 
 
Figure 11: The lines of communications between the stakeholders in case 1 
The situation led to important information being passed above the vessel manager, and 
led to decisions being taken without enough available information. The communication 
and lack of organized exchange of information was an important factor that triggered 
several of the identified problems. This was a strong indication of the lack of IO 
knowledge and practical IO utilization. Frankel (2008) states that new technology can 
facilitate new ways of communicating and organizing. If one was to modify the 
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communication paths more in line with the IO approach one could have a different 
picture. One way of improvement could be: 
1. The on-site team established an information and communication center with the 
main operational responsible persons. Linking the central to the different workers 
group at the yard. 
2. Pre-arranged video and audio link to the main involved external stakeholders 
(Frankel, 2008). 
3. A unified agreement of sharing important information as it happens, and that less 
important and internal information are filtered out. Develop a common 
information database according to Bai & Liyanage (2008) 
4. Agree upon a unified goal and make sure all parties understand the intentions of 
the information and communication central (Reitan & Pålhagen, 2004). 
5. Working together through enabling each other’s value creation and obtaining the 
common goal (Grønroos, 2000). 
Applying these seemingly simple principles the organizational and communicational 
structure presented in figure 12 could have been possible. 
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Figure 12: A possible operation central under a IO scenario 
If figure 12 would have been the actual situation one could expect several positive 
outcomes according to the theory presented in chapter 2. The expected effects, although 
not limited to, could be: 
 
- Synergetic effects with regards to transportation planning and execution 
- Quality checked information across business areas 
- Unified understanding and mitigation of potential delay causes. 
- Updated and real information, reducing misunderstandings and frustration. 
- A better foundation for making decision and alter directions as necessary. 
The potential of implementing IO into maritime asset management will be further 
described in later chapters. However, this is merely an example of how a communication 
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and information central could have improved the operations and confirms the lack of 
knowledge of IO during the project. According to Bai & Liyanage (2007) the challenges 
identified in the case studies of collecting and spreading data can be mitigated through 
establishing a web-based entry which is linked to major database within the system to 
facilitate integrated planning for the relevant participants. This could have helped to 
realize the theoretical communication and organizational structure in figure 12. 
 
In case three, the critical maintenance project of the main propulsion thruster, there was 
an example of conflicting interests among the stakeholders. Issues related to liability 
restrained the collaboration and reduced the flow of important information. This 
generated forces that pulled in opposite directions and segregated the business areas and 
the involved stakeholders. Figure 13 visualizes this effect. 
 
 
Figure 13: Representing the forces from the stakeholder’s difference of interests 
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Conflict of interest has traditionally been a natural part of the business environment. Bai 
& Liyanage (2008) describe it as a potential pit fall of not having implemented IO. The 
results of his study confirm that conflicts of interest are still a restraining factor within the 
maritime industry. However, as described in the theoretical framework of this study, the 
research within industrial services has proven the positive effect of mutual value creation 
perspective and benefits of pulling in the same direction. When focusing on your 
customers’ value creation you increase your own competiveness and hence your own 
value creation (Grønroos, 2000). The situation in case three led to an operation more 
risky than necessary. It might benefit the maritime industry to adapt to the novel 
development within the traditional service suppliers and alter its mind set. The problems 
described in the result of this case study, clearly show the lack of implementation of IO 
into maritime asset management and indicate some opportunities of applying new 
knowledge from the industrial services. As the stakeholders isolated themselves and only 
shared information that would keep them safe with regards to costs and liability. The total 
breakdown and potential accident that could have occurred would have been the result of 
disintegrated operations. The interviews also confirmed that this situation was to some 
extent acceptable and there is therefore a need to remove the economic incentives and 
contractual barriers that could root cause organizational accidents. 
 
Bai & Liyanage (2008) classified the degree of IP implementation into four levels, 
whereas level 1 is limited and level 4 is high. Looking at the case results one can easily 
argue that the maritime industry is not even complying with level 1. At the first level the 
different disciplines are supposed to plan their activities for themselves and then come up 
with a list of work. Through a multi-discipline work shop the different disciplines agree 
upon a priority list, taking different constraints under consideration. In case 1, the well 
stimulation vessel, the different parties came up with an individual list of work, but the 
multi- discipline work shop never came together. The tasks from the OSV company and 
the operator was never compared or prioritized. Looking at the next levels of IP 
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implementation, one can confirm that the description did not apply for this particular case 
and that the knowledge or willingness to comply with IP was not present. 
 
During case 2, the SEEMP, it was discovered that the OSV company did not believe that 
is was necessary to include the operators during the project. This shows the lack of 
understanding the benefits of integrating all important stakeholders. It led to the lack of 
operator’s ownership towards the OSV company’s environmental effort and was not in 
line with the operator’s own environmental initiatives. Later it turned out that the 
operator’s influence on the OSV company’s action plan was crucial for the project’s 
success. The potential positive effect of IO in this project will be further discussed in 
chapter 5.2. The case studies and the interviews have revealed the lack of theoretical and 
practical knowledge of IO in the maritime industry.  
 
The first two sub chapters have shown that there is no theoretical knowledge of IO in 
maritime asset management, nor is the principals used in practice. This answers the 
research question by showing that there is no IO implementation in the maritime industry. 
However, the study has also identified the acknowledgement and desire for the 
fundamental elements of IO. This desire was based on years of experiencing the 
symptoms of the lack of IO. Many of these symptoms are presented as the problems from 
the case studies. There clearly had to be a need for IO. 
5.1.3 The need for IO in maritime asset management 
The obstacles identified in the three case studies have been systematically categorized in 
order to further describe the lack of knowledge and implementation of IO in the maritime 
industry. Through the insight of the theoretical framework five important categories have 
been developed, that represent the main issues of IO within the frame of this study. The 
categories are briefly described below. 
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1. Technical Communication: A portable hardware and software system for audio 
and visual communication between all stakeholders at all relevant locations. 
2. Contractual requirements: The need for flexibility and openness in the contracts 
that promote sharing of information and preventive actions. Today the contracts 
have incentives that hinder collaboration and open communication. 
3. Real time and sincere information: The updated, filtered and honest information 
of the current situation which is sent to the right person at the appropriate level in 
the organization. 
4. Organize for efficient work processes and decisions: The internal and inter-
organizational structure that allows information and decisions to be processed 
effectively and with a high grade of quality. 
5. Unified understanding of the common goal and the true intentions: The system 
thinking working environment and the common understanding of mutual value 
creation. Decisions according to the managers intentions. 
The identified problems from the case studies were allowed to have causes related to 
more than one of these categories. E.g., case 2, obstacle B1: Often the PSV will be 
ordered out to an installation only carrying a single container or other minor deck loads. 
The impression of the Captain is that the vessels do not seem to be utilized well enough, 
will be related and hence placed in category 1, 3 and 4. The result of this analysis was 
137 connections within the causal categories and the sector diagram of the distribution 
can be seen in figure 14. 
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Figure 14: The distribution of the obstacles in relation to the IO categories 
It could be argued that the identified obstacles are related to all categories in some way or 
another, but in this exercise only the most relevant ones have been used. It should be 
pointed out that the connections to the categories are potentially biased as a single 
person’s experience and logical interpretations may differ from others. The result could 
be more accurate if several persons were to evaluate the connections, supported by proper 
statistical principals and methodology. However, the qualitative approach based on the 
available information indicates the need for IO and help answering the research 
questions. The results show that all of the IO principals are important elements, but there 
should be a focus towards unified understanding and effective organizations. It seems 
that contractual issues are less relevant in this setting. The results also show the issues 
identified in the case studies are relevant to the basic elements of IO.  
 
IO scenarios and the knowledge and utilization of the IO experiences in the NCS are not 
present in the maritime asset management of today. However, there seems to be 
opportunities for improvements by implementing the IO operational scenario. 
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5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
The second research question to be discussed is “what are the opportunities and 
limitations of implementing the IO approach in the maritime asset management”? The 
answers to this question will not be quantified in dollars or in the reduced number of 
accidents. However, an attempt will be made to show how IO in the maritime asset 
management could mitigate the identified problems in the case studies. The potential 
positive effect of implementing IO is already well documented in the petroleum industry 
(OLF, 2006). However, there is little or no research related to the potential effects of an 
IO approach to MAM. In this section a new way of organizing the maritime management 
will be developed in order to see the potential effect on reducing the obstacles and 
problems identified in the three case studies. As the business area of MAM and the nature 
of the vessels differ from the petroleum sector, there are also limitations that need to be 
described. In this context there is a need to clarify the understanding of limitations and 
distinguish them from problems and challenges. 
5.2.1 The opportunities in implementing IO in MAM 
The potential positive effects of introducing the IO approach into maritime asset 
management are best described by which frictional elements of operations that can be 
removed today. During the three case studies approximately 60 issues were identified as 
elements that either increased costs directly or delayed the completion of the project. In 
one or more ways these were related to the five elements of IO presented in the previous 
chapter. It is likely that if communication, cooperation and unified understanding of 
intentions and goals, and smarter organization of work tasks were well established some 
or most of the problems would have been removed. However, it is also possible that other 
circumstances outside the framework of IO influence the work processes in such a 
manner that the issues would still apply. E.g. lack of training and certification of crew 
and yard workers could have contributed significantly in some of the problems identified 
and the root cause could be international maritime legislation, i.e. outside the direct 
influence of IO compliant companies. It is therefore not certain that the IO approach 
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would have removed the problems and obstacles, but it is likely that most of them could 
have been mitigated. In order to understand the potential effects of an IO approach to 
maritime operations it is necessary to view the issues under the light of a new theoretical 
maritime organization that is in line with the basic elements of IO. The next chapter will 
describe a novel way of organizing the work processes of a modern maritime asset 
management company. 
 
The new organization and operation of MAM 
Based on the theoretical framework in this study, the practical experience of the 
undersigned’s experience in vessel management, the interviews and the issues identified 
in the case studies, key elements have been identified which needs to be in place in a 
novel maritime management organization. These elements are: 
 
1. The individual stakeholders need to be independent from their geographical 
location. 
2. A technical solution for live audio and visual communication between all 
stakeholders. 
a. Operation Centers should be established at key locations. 
b. Compatible software and hardware that is personal and portable. 
c. Increased data exchange capacity between OSVs and shore. 
3. A database with information of the stakeholders work orders, project description, 
logs etc., open to all parties involved, and restricted to others. 
4. A software program that can set up and handle communications groups according 
to projects, fleets and various scenarios. 
5. An open communication policy. 
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a. Contractual flexibility, i.e. no indirect off-hire incentives. 
b. Unified understanding and acceptance of stated goals and intentions. 
c. Filtered information, live and specialized information packages upon 
request. 
6. An established and maintained communication path to all relevant stakeholders 
and centers. 
7. A seamless change of working groups and processes between projects and normal 
operations. 
8. A team based solution of working. 
a. Fixed participants from the OSV company. 
b. The authority to manage short term objectives. 
c. The fixed team members have the same fleet of vessels. 
9. The traditional line mangers focus on managing medium to long term objectives 
and measure performance. 
Based on these necessary elements, the principals of IO and the intent to mitigate the 
identified problems in the case studies, the following organization have been developed. 
 
The common description and attributes: 
The new organization is based on operation teams. Each team has the responsibility of a 
small fleet of vessels. The team is led by the vessel manager and consists of one person 
from each business area within the OSV company. The persons are on coordinator (sub-
managerial) level and their respective manages are normally not in the daily operational 
loop. Their respective business area managers are instead concerned of verifying that 
operations within their segments are according to the company’s strategic decisions and 
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medium to long term goals. The geographical location of the team members is irrelevant 
as they communicate visually and by audio via their personal laptop or smart phone. 
Within the maritime management company the team members are fixed. However, there 
are several positions flexible according to the different scenarios. These available spots 
are filled by operator representatives, OEMs, Captain and Chief Engineers, project 
managers at yards etc., i.e. flexibility based on the actual situation. The different 
scenarios are described in detail later in this chapter. 
 
The fixed team from the maritime onshore management will not change based on the 
scenario. However, there will be a seamless change between normal operation, MM 
projects or critical situations. The changeover will mainly be seen in the composition of 
the external stakeholders in the loop. The geographical independency is vital for the 
team’s success. Even if the vessel manager is on the far side of the world, e.g. on the 
docking facility or the procurement coordinator is on a conference in southern Europe, 
establishing the team is as easy as if they were next door office neighbors. The necessary 
expansion of the teams based on the scenario will be modified as needed as they have 
compatible equipment locally and understand the new work process. An important part of 
this new operating scenario is the acknowledgement and unified understanding by the 
operator, OEMs and the vessel’s crew. There is a need for including them in the 
development of the system in order for them to feel ownership to the suggested change. 
The potential positive effects should be highlighted to establish a willingness to change. 
The organizational change will have to be fronted and supported by senior management. 
The different scenarios are visually presented below. 
 
The normal operation scenario: 
In the normal operation scenario the MAM team is established when necessary, not at 
fixed intervals. The day to day operation of the vessel fleet is supported as usual and their 
respective operators are in the loop. Having the operator connected and understanding the 
operating scenario, mutual exchange is easier. It is likely that the operators will keep the 
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MAM team in the operator’s IO loop as well. In the future there might even be only one 
single and unified loop. The information about current operation is exchanged and all 
stakeholders are updated. The individuals can work with their respective business task 
separately, but when needed the team hooks up and coordinate their effort in the IO loop. 
Figure 15 show how the elements are connected in the new MAM scenario. In this 
scenario vessel 2 and 4 have the same operator and the normal daily tasks are supported 
by the MAM team as necessary. 
 
 
Figure 15: The normal operation scenario of the new IO MAM 
If the new organizational structure in figure 15 is compared to the traditional 
organizational chart in chapter 4, the advantages of the new structure is intuitively 
obvious. The constraints of communication and efficient cooperation are reduced. 
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The project based scenario: 
An important attribute of the new organization is the seamless shift between operation 
scenarios. It is favorable if the communication method, tools and teams change as little as 
possible, even if the work task changes dramatically. This will reduce time spent in 
establishing groups, connecting etc. In an MM scenario the same MAM team is already 
established, but other managers and external experts are connected to the loop when 
needed. An example of how these elements can be connected is shown in figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16: A MM operation scenario of the new maritime asset management 
The internal loop is virtual and drawn for helping to understand the process. It is 
important that the external addition to the loop feels included and not only additives. This 
way of organizing and communicating could remove the problem that the vessel manager 
is alone at the yard, handling all business areas alone locally. The support team will be 
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more present, and the other vessels will be handled as normal only by shifting between 
operation scenarios in the IO software. It will also ease the necessary support during 
holidays as the team members can connect from home or wherever they spend their 
vacation. 
 
The critical situation scenario: 
If a critical situation occurs during normal operations it is important to have system 
experts, decision authority and support elements informed quickly in order to overcome 
the uncertainty and to quickly mitigate risk. By changing the operating scenario and 
connecting the necessary stakeholders, the expanded team is established within minutes 
and ready to act. A typical communication network of this scenario is presented in figure 
17. 
 
Figure 17: The critical situation scenario in the new MAM 
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Traditionally, critical situations are handled in a company by establishing an Emergency 
Response Team (ERT). There are several problems with these groups and they are often 
identified through exercises. Some of the typical problems are: 
- The team members are rarely cooperating in this kind of an environment and it takes 
time before for the team organization is effective. 
- The senior managers are often travelling and not able to participate. 
- The knowledge of the operation or the technical challenges is not understood.  
- It takes a long time to establish the team. 
 
If the new MAM team approach as described above is used, all of these problems will be 
reduced or removed entirely. The operational cooperation and communications between 
the stakeholders has become streamlined.  
5.2.2 Other positive outcomes 
The opportunities of implementing an IO approach to MAM are many. Some of them are 
already mentioned and are quite intuitive. If the identified problems in the case studies 
are revisited, one fine that there are several examples of issues that could have been 
avoided. 
 
Case 1, problem A2: With no fixed place to undertake the project, there were no place to 
send the parts and special tools. A consequence of this was sub-optimal storage of parts 
with respect to the ambient conditions such as moisture and temperature. It was difficult 
to prepare for a fast shipment to the actual location when the decision was made, or the 
ability for the yard to prepare the equipment. If all elements of IO described above where 
in place and the MAM team was established and function as in figure 16, it is likely that 
this situation could have been avoided. It is probable that solutions would have emerged 
in the close cooperation and information scenario.  
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E.g.: 
- The operator’s storage facility could have been used. 
- The OSV company’s acknowledgment of the operator’s market position at the 
time could have initiated a request to the class for a postponement. This would 
have enabled a fixed place and time for undertaking the project after the 
operator’s high value market had closed. 
- The exchange of the real time information of the deterioration onboard, could 
have led to the acknowledgment and understanding of the critical urge for 
commencing the project. 
- The OEM included in the loop would have increased the probability of having 
parts ready to be sent in very short notice or be stored at the OEM local store 
house. 
 
If case two is revisited one can for instance find probable positive alternative outcomes in 
problem A1: A problem is identified as the vessel has to have enough engines running in 
both engine rooms that can supply the entire vessel single handedly. This means that a 
total of three engines have to be running at all time. In a closed bus-tie it would be 
enough to have one engine in each room and a third in standby. Running with an open 
bus tie breaker leads to an unnecessary high fuel consumption. Examples of probable 
actions in a new MAM team based IO scenario are: 
- The close communication in the team would have allowed the OEM to verify the 
safe mode of using closed bus-tie, as the vessel was designed that way. 
- It is likely that the operator would have changed their view after including the 
class and flag state which could confirm that this was a safe and legal way of 
operating the power grid onboard.  
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- The OSV company together with the OEM, could argue better for their action 
plan to remove the probability of a flawed bus tie breaker. I.e. the use of condition 
monitoring, testing and concentrated inspection campaigns etc. could have 
convinced the operator of the equipment working as intended. 
- The team could have included the insurance company in transferring the lessons 
learned from the previous incidents. Connecting the entire fleet, with all captains 
and chief engineers would have facilitated the broad experience transfer from the 
accidents, hence reducing the probability of similar situation occurring and 
convincing the operators to allow running with a closed bus tie. 
- The team could have easier explained the environmental need and effect of 
shutting down the extra engine. 
- A compromise would have been obtained easier. E.g. the vessel could perform a 
risk analysis before every required DP23 operation if it was safe to run with a 
closed bus tie. 
All of the problems identified in the case studies could have been listed in this chapter 
and been used to argue how the new MAM team under the IO philosophy could have 
improved the business. However, it should be underlined that the word could is used with 
intent. It is not certain that the problems would have been removed, but is highly 
probable that the situation would improve. The theoretical “solutions” described above 
could have been utilized under the current traditional approach to MAM as well. 
However, as this study has shown, seemingly simple solutions become difficult to 
implement under the existing organizational constraints. 
  
  
                                                 
3 DP2 – Are the second safety level of a dynamically positioned vessel, i.e. the requirement of always 
having 50 % residual capacity after a single failure. 
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Other positive opportunities by the use of IO in MAM 
Other likely potential positive effects of the new way of running maritime operations 
could be: 
- The petroleum industry and the NMA have stated that the on shore management 
are not updated on the operations and does not acknowledge the responsibility 
they carry according to maritime law. IO would have facilitated an increase in 
operational awareness between the Vessel Manager and the operator and between 
the Vessel Manager and the crew. It would have forced an awareness of the 
operational risk and the responsibility of the Vessel Manager. 
- The normal working task of running the vessel manager’s fleet when undertaking 
an MM project could have improved. It would be easier to contact the other 
vessels, the communication between the vessel and the different coordinators 
would have been improved. Often the vessel manger acts like a bottle neck when 
having to relay information or questions from the coordinator to the vessel. This 
would have led to less work, more efficient dialogue and less need of 
administrative tasks for the onboard crew. 
- The response to critical situations could have improved. The prearranged 
communication and information exchange with the OEM, class and flag state 
would enable the correct interpretation of information and making decisions that 
improves the situation faster. The measurement and evaluation of the decision 
could be relayed live and altered as necessary. 
- The utilization of the operator’s vast network of knowledge and resources. E.g. 
storage facilities, OEM network, transportation arrangements, system knowledge 
of operations. A unified understanding of the common goal and focus towards the 
partner’s value creation would have removed the incentive to withhold 
information or prey on others misfortune. E.g. if there is a periodic failure on any 
equipment on board, the operators often accepts to continue operations. However, 
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if the weather stops the operations, the operator may be tempted to suddenly take 
the vessel off-hire due to the failure of equipment. This could lead to the OSV 
company withholding this kind of information next time, making the situation 
worse for all involved stakeholders. This situation is quite common and leads to 
mistrust and removes the unified value creation initiatives. If however, the 
elements of IO presented above are well established, this situation would not be 
allowed to occur.  
- A major problem in the maritime industry according the NMA is the 
implementation process. Several high quality action plans may be developed after 
an accident or similar, but the action is not always implemented and even more 
seldom are the implementation verified or measured for effect. The new MAM 
way of operating would ease both the implementation part and the verification. 
The easy connection to the vessels, the expert personnel and the authority could 
improve this situation. 
- The sharing of live and updated information, the understanding of the current 
operation and the closer involvement of management on shore could reduce the 
risk associated with the complex operations in the NCS. 
- As communication has become easier by modern hardware, the OSV company 
will save travelling costs for their employees. 
- The psychological distance between the crew and the office back home will be 
reduced as visual and audio communication is more frequent. 
There is a tremendous amount of opportunities for positive effects from developing a new 
approach to maritime operations. In many ways only the imagination sets the limit for 
what is likely to be improved. However, in reality there are some limitations one should 
be aware of. 
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5.2.3 The limitations 
First of all it is necessary to distinguish between identified problems, challenges and 
limitations. In this study they are related, but might be mitigated in different ways. The 
identified issues in the case studies are concise, seemingly small and direct. These issues 
should be seen as the problems in this context. The root causes behind the problems are 
the challenges. As some of the challenges are so deeply incorporated or require a global 
approach or business effort outside the influence of industrial asset management, they 
should be acknowledged as limitations. These elements could limit the possibility of 
develop, implement or use IO as an operational approach to maritime management. Both 
the problems and the challenges that could be overcome have been presented in previous 
chapters. However, the challenges that are more long term and defined as limitations are 
presented in this section. Understanding the concept of limitations as described above 
there are only a few rightfully placed in this category. 
- Contractual: The normal contracts today in the OSV business area include 
elements that leave the vessel off-hire. This might be elements of equipment 
failure, lack of proper manning, superfluous to operation etc. They vary 
according to the operators and geographical areas. The limiting factor is that 
some of the contractual requirements function as incentives to withhold 
important information, hide future plans and remove the potential synergetic 
effects. These contracts are based on international standards and are difficult 
to alter within the segment of industrial asset management. 
- Offshore data transfer: Recent years the internet capacities for OSV have 
increased and the cost of Kbit/s has been reduced, however this is still an 
important limiting factor when the vessel is on the high seas. It is expected 
that this problem will be mitigated shortly as the internet capacity by satellite 
communication improves exponentially over time. 
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- Unified understanding across business areas: Traditional departmental 
segregation in the organization and the top-down hierarchical management 
way is not just an identified problem. The lack of understanding change 
management or willingness to change is so significant that it have become a 
limiting factor of implementing IO. It will improve over time, but it is 
expected to be a timely process. Senior management in OSV companies in 
Norway is very often former captains or fishermen from the very foundation 
of the company. Through a highly developed business instinct they managed 
to create a credible company even if they lacked formal education. However, 
in the modern global market this is no longer the only ingredient. The 
knowledge of organizational theory, change management and decision 
engineering is lacking and limit the immediate implementation of IO. 
There might be other limiting factors not identified in this chapter, but under the 
current understanding of what a limiting factor really is, most problem and the 
corresponding challenges fall outside of this category. Near all the identified 
problems can be mitigated by acknowledging and facing up to the challenges. The 
limiting factors of implementing IO in maritime asset management are therefore 
few in this study, but it is recommended to revisit the previously identified 
problems in order to take the appropriate action. 
5.2.4 Action plan 
It might be helpful for an OSV company to have a road map for implementing IO. Even 
if it is beyond the scope of this study, some recommended action areas have been 
developed. Specific action points will be highlighted in summarizing this study. 
However, there is a need to develop the list further and customize it according to the 
different maritime environment. 
 
  
A Maritime Perspective on Integrated Operations 
In the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 88 
To the operators: 
In order for the OSV companies to take the step into IO the operators needs to take the 
responsibility to kick start the process. The operators have to start requiring the same 
level of IO compatibility from the OSV suppliers as they do from their other suppliers. 
Before the requirements take full effect they need to inform and educate. The operators 
have to inform of the experience from the implementation process in the NCS and 
educate about the benefits that IO have facilitated and how to achieve this operational 
approach. There are normally several dialogue meetings and conferences during the year 
and thereby many opportunities to start setting IO on the MAM’s agenda. The operators 
need to prepare for including the OSV companies and their vessel in their onshore IO 
centers other than in the pure logistical context. They have to start facilitating to provide 
more assistance and support during different operational scenarios, also those that rise 
during off-hire periods. As long as the vessel is on long term contract with the operator, it 
is in the highest interests for the operator that the vessel returns to normal services as 
soon as possible and with the problems truly solved. The operator needs to take more 
responsibility to include, inform and to some degree informal educate the OSV managers 
of the current offshore operations. If the technical operational perspective is really 
understood, it is more likely that the vessel manager will foresee obstacles and mitigated 
them before they come into effect. The information and education could be a part of the 
dialogue meetings, the daily correspondence or relevant courses could be made targeting 
the OSV managers specifically. 
 
The operators need to acknowledge the OSV as important tools integrated in their 
petroleum activities and abandon the perception of them being external maritime 
additives. Due to the operational and technical complexity with well intervention and 
subsea construction, the vessels are not merely maritime assets, but important assets in 
the petroleum sector as well. This raise the need for a clarification with regards to 
maritime and petroleum laws and regulations. 
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The problems identified with planning and spending the accumulated maintenance days 
led to the postponement or abandonment of environmental initiatives. The operator 
should evaluate the need for having extra maintenance days on-hire intended for 
environmental maintenance. E.g. polishing of propellers, cleaning of heat exchanger or 
high pressure cleaning of the hull.  
 
To the authority: 
For IO to take full effect there is a need for clarification of rules and regulation in the 
intersectional area of maritime and petroleum activities. The traditional maritime 
regulation does not cover the new challenges in these operations. The maritime assets 
onboard are so interconnected with the petroleum asset onboard that it is no longer 
distinguishable. The petroleum law of the NCS does not cover these assets either. The 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) stated to the NMA that they were only 
concerned with maritime assets directly storing or handling hydrocarbons. By this 
definition the OSV are not included. This leaves a regulation gap that needs to be 
bridged. In order for IO to be fully utilized in the NCS there is a need for clear and 
concise laws and regulations that place the responsibility and liability in the right hands. 
If this void is not filled it is not likely that the cooperation during off-hire and during 
complex operations will improve.   
 
The authority also needs to give room for the OSV companies to operate in a novel 
manner. E.g. the condition monitoring of rotating equipment and postponement of 
bearing replacement based on the actual condition was previously rejected. The calendar 
or hourly based maintenance routine had to be done regardless of the actual condition of 
the equipment. This has later been accepted, but exemplifies how rules and regulation can 
work against the novel way of working. Inspection campaigns and revisions of the safety 
management system have to be modified in order to promote IO. The authority should 
also take responsibility to inform and champion the benefits from IO in the NCS and 
highlight this through their regular contact with the industry. 
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To the OSV companies: 
The OSV companies have to take the largest steps. There is need for them to abandon the 
traditional hierarchical organization and communication pathways. The OSV companies 
needs to reorganize in order to promote internal communication and horizontal 
cooperation. The business areas of the company need to be integrated and operated on a 
lower level. The senior management needs to state their goals and intentions, verify that it 
is understood, and then leave it to lower staff to handle the operations within this frame. 
The senior management needs to focus towards controlling the path towards their 
strategic decisions. Measure if their goals are reached; alter directions as necessary and 
benchmark with high performing companies in order to increase their competitiveness. 
 
The OSV company should pursuit the new knowledge of industrial services and IO in 
order to understand the larger picture or their actions and organizations. It might be 
necessary to motivate senior management to take courses and classes in order to be 
inspired with new thoughts and insights. They should take the initiative to invite the 
operators to share their experience within the field of IO and should visit their onshore IO 
centers for inspirations and ideas. They should set up a meeting with different IO 
consultant companies to compare what they can offer and how their company can benefit 
from implementing the approach. 
 
The OSV company should make an investment analysis of implementing IO. An external 
expert should be hired to analyze the present value of the costs and savings from 
changing to the IO approach. It is often so that money talks and if the senior management 
can see for themselves a positive present value, they just might make the investment. If 
the OSV company undertakes the necessary changes and investments and truly 
understand and believe in IO they should gain an advantage over other OSV companies 
that has not. The OSV companies which are future oriented towards operations should 
increase their competitiveness and profit from the investment. 
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5.3 ANY NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH? 
The literature search and the contact with the relevant industrial knowledge hubs have 
revealed a need for further research. The need is particularly towards maritime asset 
management within the frame of IO. It was not possible to locate any ongoing research 
that focused on the asset management of OSV vessels and the complex cooperation 
environment with the operators. There is several ongoing projects within IO, but these are 
mainly aimed at increasing oil recovery, accelerate production, reducing operating costs 
and enhancing safety and environmental standards. NTNU4 has an IO research center that 
undertakes these tasks, but they are limited towards the offshore installations and the 
petroleum perspective. If the vessels are involved it is merely with respect to logistics 
during normal operations. Within the petroleum related activities such as drilling, 
reservoir management etc., the research activity within IO is high. Within the maritime 
perspective IO seems to only be studied in Norway in the context of simulation and 
training capacities of anchor handling and tug support vessels. Høgskolen i Ålesund has 
research programs which study the working relationship and integration of the MOU and 
the vessel. However, there has not been any identified ongoing research of IO into 
maritime asset management. 
 
There is need for further research, particularly into maritime asset management and how 
IO can be utilized in this sector. The complex business area of the intersection of 
petroleum and maritime activities has never been more present than now. This 
complexity requires more cooperation between previous segregated business areas. There 
is a need for further research into the synergetic possibilities of the integration of business 
areas in the NCS. The identified need for further research has been divided into two main 
categories: 
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The intersection of the petroleum and maritime asset management: 
As the intersection widens, the borderline between the traditional maritime and petroleum 
activities have disappeared. This has created challenges related to the following subjects: 
- The gap between and in some cases duplication of the maritime and petroleum 
law and regulations. 
- The need for knowledge of offshore technology in the traditional maritime 
industry. The need for training and education of specialists in addition to the 
traditional certification of the maritime crew. I.e. the area of certification and 
education of both crew members and on shore managers. 
- The clarification of roles and responsibilities between installation personnel 
and maritime personnel onboard. I.e. the Offshore Installation Manager and 
the maritime Captain. 
- The role and responsibility between the NMA and the PSA. 
Integrated maritime operations 
The focus towards down whole solutions and the increased use of subsea installations 
have created a need for novel maritime operations. The study into the field of integrated 
maritime operations has identified several needs for further research. These focus areas 
are: 
- A roadmap for adapting IO in the maritime industry. 
- A study that attempts to quantify the potential value creation of implementing 
the IO approach to maritime operations. 
- A study of the practical on board solutions for IO communication to shore. 
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PART FOUR: SUMMARIZATION 
6 Conclusions 
The recent development of advanced offshore support vessels (OSV), engaged in 
complex subsea operations has challenged the traditional Norwegian maritime industry. 
From merely transporting passengers and cargo over vast distances, modern ships have 
developed into precision tools in the Oil & Gas sector. Due to their mobility and multi-
purpose opportunities, maritime vessels have become increasingly attractive assets in this 
sector. As this inter sectional area has widened, the borderline between the maritime and 
the petroleum industry has become more diffuse. The knowledge based and technology 
driven development requires a modern managerial approach. As a response to the 
challenges the petroleum industry was facing during the 1990’s, they restructured its 
approach to operations by smarter and more efficient work processes. The petroleum 
industry began to successfully implement these advanced solutions under its novel 
operational scenario, termed Integrated Operations (IO). However, despite of this effort 
the maritime industry seemed oblivious to the new approach and its documented effect. 
There was a need to acquire more knowledge of the current operational situation in a 
modern OSV company and search for a future solution for a sustainable operational 
approach across the business areas. 
 
This study’s main objective was to identify the opportunities and limitations of 
implementing IO into maritime asset management. However, it was first necessary to 
describe to what extent IO already was a part of the daily operational environment. By 
the use of three case studies and supported by interviews, several operational and 
organizational problems have been identified. The problems were specific symptoms of 
poor communication and the lack of a collaborative environment between the operational 
stakeholders. By combining the theoretical framework and the study of the identified 
problems, a novel approach to maritime asset management has been developed. The new 
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approach is an adaptation of the fundamental IO principles, modified to fit the maritime 
organization and the challenges they are facing. The results show few limitations and 
many opportunities in applying IO in maritime asset management. The study shows that 
it is probable, although not easily quantifiable, that several of the identified problems can 
be mitigated. Based on the theoretical framework, the novel operational scenario and the 
identified problems, several recommendations have been developed. These are addressed 
to the petroleum operators, the authority and the OSV companies. 
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
There was a need to find out if IO already was a part of the maritime operational 
environment, to what extent and if utilized consciously or not. The results showed that 
none of the maritime interviewees were familiar with the term. They could not elaborate 
of its meaning and had no knowledge of its principles or use. The representatives for the 
petroleum operators knew the term well. As expected they understood IO and were 
familiar with the efficiency leaps in the NCS. However, they viewed IO merely as a tool 
for the petroleum industry with regards to increasing the recovery rate, drilling operation 
efficiency etc., and not to be used in a maritime context. The only connection they could 
foresee was during normal operations. According to the interview there was a contractual 
need to keep distance between the operators and the OSV companies when the vessel was 
off-hire. However, the interview with the IO consultant verified that other petroleum 
operators planned to require IO compatibility from the OSV companies in the near future. 
The interviews verified the lack of knowledge of IO within the maritime sector, and 
showed a difference of opinions with regards to the IO opportunities in the maritime 
market. The interviews also revealed that the crew and the senior management on shore 
acknowledged the need for many of the same elements that one finds in IO. The crew 
wanted closer cooperation, sharing of relevant and filtered information in real time and a 
centralized decision handling process. 
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In order to verify these results it was decided to analyze the three case studies for any 
signs of practical use of the IO approach. The results showed no signs of use, instead 
verified the lack of IO in maritime asset management. It was highlighted that the results 
contained a significant degree of uncertainty as the case studies were represented by a 
single OSV company. It might be that other OSV companies had come further in 
developing IO. The uncertainty factor was reduced by two main elements. The first was 
the fact that this particular OSV company was one of the five major OSV companies in 
Norway and one of the largest in the world. The four other OSV companies had similar 
vessels, organizations, operators and operational areas. It was likely to also experience 
the same operational and organizational challenges. The second mean of reducing the 
level of uncertainty was the interview with the NMA and the operators. They both 
confirmed that as far as they could witness, the situation was similar in the other major 
companies and that this particular OSV company was representable for the industry. 
 
Bai & Liyanage (2008) classified the degree of IP into four levels, whereas level 1 is 
limited and level 4 is high. The results of the case studies showed that the maritime 
industry was not even complying with level 1. Looking at the next levels of IP 
implementation, one could also confirm that the description did not apply and that the 
knowledge or willingness to comply with integrated planning was not present. The latter 
part of the analysis verified that there actually is a need for IO in maritime asset 
management. The chaotic and erratic communication paths between the OSV company 
and its external stakeholders, the ineffective organizational structure during projects, the 
lack of management involvement and limited knowledge of the ongoing operations and 
the segregated business areas, showed a need for integrated operations in maritime asset 
management.  
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6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
The second research question addressed the opportunities and limitations of 
implementing IO into maritime asset management. In order to describe the limitations the 
term had to be distinguished from problems and challenges. The identified problems in 
the case studies are concise, seemingly small and direct. These were the problems. The 
root causes behind the problems were the challenges. As some of the challenges are so 
deeply incorporated in the industry or require a global effort outside the influence of the 
companies, they should be regarded as the limitations. There were mainly two areas that 
might limit the implementation of IO under the described definition. The first issue is the 
data transfer capacity offshore. As the petroleum sector has solved this problem by using 
a broad band fiber network at the bottom of the sea, the vessels still needs to use satellite 
communication. This restricts the amount of data to be transferred and increase the costs. 
However, the development in this field is tremendous and it is likely to be mitigated in 
the near future. The second major limitations are the level of knowledge and education. 
The onshore staff in maritime organizations normally come from positions onboard the 
vessels, and holds maritime certifications and education. Currently this education does 
not have organizational theory, decision engineering and performance management as 
subjects. The utilization of integrated operations requires a different approach to maritime 
education, updated to fit modern organizational theory, change management and 
understanding across business sectors. Without the unified understanding of goals and 
intentions, the acknowledgement of your partners’ value creation and novel industrial 
service approach, it is likely that the implementation of IO in maritime asset management 
will fail or have its potential effect limited. 
 
The opportunities of implementing IO in maritime asset management are many. This 
study has shown how a novel approach to the organization and communication within the 
maritime asset management environment is likely to mitigate specific problems during 
operations. By three case studies approximately 60 problems were identified as elements 
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that either increased costs directly or delayed the completion of the project. The analysis 
showed that these were related to the organizational and systems perspective of 
causation. The opportunities of mitigating these problems have not been quantified, but 
the amount of potential saving in time and direct costs are significant. By analyzing the 
problems and modifying the theoretical framework of this study, it was possible to 
develop a novel approach to integrated maritime operations. Several key elements were 
developed that framed the structure of the operational approach. The common description 
and attributes of the new operational approach are: 
The new organization is based on operation teams. Each team has the responsibility of a 
small fleet of vessels. The team is led by the vessel manager and consists of one person 
from each business area within the OSV company. The persons are on coordinator (sub-
managerial) level and their respective manages are normally not in the daily operational 
loop. Their respective business area managers are instead concerned with verifying that 
operations within their segments are according to the company’s strategic decisions and 
medium to long term goals. The geographical location of the team members is irrelevant 
as they communicate visually and by audio via their personal laptop or smart phone. 
Within the maritime management company the team members are fixed. However, there 
are several positions flexible according to the different scenarios. These available spots 
are filled by operator representatives, OEMs, Captain and Chief Engineers, project 
managers at yards etc., i.e. flexibility based on the actual situation.  
 
The fixed team from the maritime onshore management will not change based on the 
scenario. However, there will be a seamless change between normal operation, 
maintenance and modification projects or critical situations. The changeover will mainly 
be seen in the composition of the external stakeholders in the loop. The necessary 
expansion of the team will be enabled by compatible equipment locally and an 
understanding of the new work processes. An important part of this new operating 
scenario is the acknowledgement and unified understanding by the operator, OEMs and 
the vessel’s crew. There is a need for including them in the development in order for 
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them to feel ownership to the suggested change. The potential positive effects should be 
highlighted in order to establish a willingness to change. The organizational change will 
have to be fronted and supported by senior management.  
 
The study shows examples of how the new integrated maritime operational scenario is 
likely to mitigate the identified problems in the three case studies and how all 
stakeholders will increase their value, based on the partners’ increased performance. In 
order to achieve this operating scenario there are several obstacles that needs to be 
acknowledged and overcome. These are highlighted in the recommendation to the 
industry in chapter 7. 
6.3 THE NEED FOR FURTHER KNOWLEDGE 
Throughout this study several ongoing research programs within the subject of IO has 
been identified. However, the only study of IO within the maritime perspective seems to 
be in the context of simulation and training capacities of anchor handling and tug support 
vessels. Høgskolen i Ålesund has started a research program looking at the working 
relationship and integration of the MOU and the vessel during an operation. However, 
none of these programs focus on maritime asset management. One of the most relevant 
studies in this respect is at the Center for Industrial Asset Management at the University 
of Stavanger. Their research within maintenance management and integrated planning 
has been relevant for the problems identified in the case studies. However, there is need 
for further research, particularly into maritime asset management and how IO can be 
utilized in this sector. The identified need for further research has been divided into the 
following areas: 
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The intersection of the petroleum and maritime asset management 
As the intersection widens, the borderline between the traditional maritime and petroleum 
activities have disappeared. This has created challenges related to the following subjects: 
- The gap between and in some cases duplication of the maritime and petroleum 
law and regulations. 
- The need for knowledge of offshore technology in the traditional maritime 
industry. The need for training and education of specialists in addition to the 
traditional certification of the maritime crew. I.e. the area of certification and 
education of both crew members and onshore managers. 
- The clarification of roles and responsibilities between installation personnel 
and maritime personnel onboard. I.e. the Offshore Installation Manager and 
the maritime Captain. 
- The role and responsibility between the NMA and the PSA. 
Integrated maritime operations: 
The focus towards down-whole solutions and the increased use of subsea installation has 
created a need for novel maritime operations. The study into the field of the integrated 
maritime operations has identified several needs for further research. These focus areas 
are: 
- A roadmap for adapting IO in the maritime industry. 
- A study that attempt to quantify the potential value creation of implementing 
the IO approach to maritime operations. 
- A study of the practical on board solutions for IO communication to shore. 
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7 Recommendations 
In order for IO to be fully implemented into the maritime asset management environment 
there is a need for a joint effort between the oil field operators, the OSV companies and 
the authorities. However, this study has concluded with 13 recommended actions 
specified to each part of the industry. For the different stakeholders it is easy to argue that 
the specific recommendations below are not a part of their responsibility. They might be 
correct according to the law. However, if the implementation of IO is to be successful it 
is necessary to look beyond the normal distribution of responsibility.  
7.1 TO THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
To enable the OSV companies to take the first step into IO, the operators need to accept 
the responsibility of kick starting the process. There are several initiatives the operator 
could take responsibility for. The following actions are recommended for the petroleum 
operators: 
I. Prepare to require the same level of IO compatibility from the OSV 
companies as they already do from their offshore OEM suppliers. 
 
II. Before the requirements take full effect they need to inform and educate the 
OSV companies. The operators have to inform of the experience from the 
implementation process in the NCS and educate about the benefits that IO 
have made possible. They should also describe how the operators undertook 
the process of restructuring. 
  
III. The operators need to prepare for including the OSV companies and their long 
term vessels in their current onshore IO centers beyond the logistical context. 
They have to start facilitating to provide more assistance and support during 
different operational scenarios, also those that rise during off-hire periods. As 
long as the vessel is on long term contract with the operator, it is in the highest 
interests of the operator that the vessel returns to normal services as soon as 
possible and with the problems corrected. 
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IV. The operator should consider taking more responsibility to include, inform 
and to some extent educate the OSV managers about the current offshore 
operations. If the operational situation is understood, it is more likely that the 
vessel manager will foresee obstacles and mitigated them before they come 
into effect. The information and training could be part of the normal dialogue 
meetings, the daily reporting or specific courses. 
 
V. The problems identified with regards to planning and spending the 
accumulated maintenance days led to the postponement or abandonment of 
environmental initiatives. The operator should consider the need for having 
extra maintenance days on-hire tagged for environmental maintenance 
purposes. E.g. polishing of propellers, cleaning of heat exchanger or high 
pressure cleaning of the hull. 
As the operators are likely to benefit from the implementation of IO into maritime asset 
management it is in their interest that these actions are further developed. However, there 
are also actions to be taken by the authorities. 
7.2 TO THE AUTHORITY 
For IO to take full effect there is a need for the clarification of rules and regulation in the 
intersectional area of maritime and petroleum activities. The traditional maritime 
regulation does not cover the new challenges in these operations. The maritime assets 
onboard are so interconnected with the petroleum assets that it is no longer 
distinguishable. There is a need for action to be taken by the authorities in the following 
areas: 
VI. The NMA and the PSA should compare their set of rules and regulations 
relevant to the inter section areas and perform a gap analysis. 
 
VII. The NMA should discuss with the classification societies and evaluate if the 
current rules and regulations of cargo ships are complete with regards to the 
new operating scenarios and technical development of OSVs. 
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VIII. The authority should take the responsibility to inform the maritime industry of 
the documented outcomes from IO in the NCS with regards to safer operations 
and motivate the industry to undertake the same efficiency leap. 
The maritime and the petroleum safety authority have the opportunity to influence the 
implementations process of IO in the maritime industry and clarify the responsibilities 
and liabilities with regards to the tight couplings of the operating scenario. However, it is 
the maritime management companies which carry the largest responsibilities to act. 
7.3 TO THE MARITIME MANAGEMENT 
There is need for the OSV companies to abandon the traditional hierarchical 
organizational structure and vertical communication pathways. The OSV companies 
needs to reorganize in order to promote internal communication and horizontal 
cooperation. In order to develop and implement IO into maritime asset management, 
there are several recommended actions that should be considered. These are: 
IX. The business areas of the company need to be integrated and operated on a 
lower level. The senior management should state their goals and intentions, 
verify that it is understood, and then leave it to lower staff to handle the 
operations within this frame. 
  
X. The senior management needs to focus towards controlling the path towards 
their strategic decisions. Measure if their goals are reached; alter directions as 
necessary and benchmark with high performing companies in order to 
increase their competitiveness. 
 
XI. The OSV companies should pursuit the new knowledge of industrial services 
and IO in order to understand the larger picture or their actions and 
organizations. It might be necessary to motivate senior management to take 
courses and classes in order to be inspired with new thoughts and insight. 
 
XII. The OSV companies should take initiative to invite the operators to share their 
experience within the field of IO and should visit their onshore IO centers for 
inspirations and ideas. They should set up meetings with different IO 
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consultant companies to compare what they can offer and how their company 
can benefit. 
 
XIII. The OSV companies should make an investment analysis of implementing IO.  
An external expert could be engaged in order to analyze the present value of 
the costs and savings from changing to the IO approach. 
 
If an OSV company undertakes the necessary changes and investments and truly 
understand IO they should gain an advantage over other OSV companies. The OSV 
companies which are future oriented towards operations should be able to increase their 
competitiveness and profit from the investment. However, the willingness to revolt the 
deeply incorporated ineffective traditions and change according to the pace of global 
market requirements will prove favorable for all stakeholders in general and for the OSV 
companies in particular. 
 
To all the responsible industrial managers, I leave you with the famous words5 of 
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971): 
 
 
God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
the courage to change the things I can 
and the wisdom to know the difference 
 
 
                                                 
5 Also sometimes attributed to St. Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) 
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